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ABSTRACT  
The Psychological Experience of Middle-Power in Social Hierarchies:  
A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation 
Eric M. Anicich 
 
In this dissertation, I theoretically and empirically examine the psychological experience of 
middle-power, which occurs when someone frequently alternates between adopting behavioral 
strategies targeting higher-power and lower-power interaction partners. In Chapter 1, I update 
and extend the approach/inhibition theory of power (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) by 
developing a novel theoretical framework related to the psychological experience of middle-
power. This new theoretical perspective draws from and integrates insights from role-based 
identity (Ashforth & Johnson, 2001; Stryker, 1980) and role transition theories (Ashforth, 
Kreiner, & Fugate, 2000). In Chapter 2, I conduct a systematic review of the social hierarchy 
literature over the past 10 years and demonstrate that scholars have considered the middle of the 
distribution with respect to stratifying variables in only 5.4% of past empirical investigations. 
This conscious absence of the middle forces us to reconsider existing findings in the social 
hierarchy literature. In Chapters 3 and 4, I examine the relationship between power and unethical 
behavior and present evidence of a curvilinear relationship: middle-power individuals 
consistently behave more ethically than both their higher and lower-power counterparts. Taken 
together, these insights highlight the importance of considering the antecedents and 
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CHAPTER 1  
VERTICAL CODE-SWITCHING, ROLE CONFLICT, AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
EXPERIENCE OF MIDDLE-POWER 
 One of the first things an employee is likely to perceive upon joining a new organization 
is a complex system of power relations. Power is a pervasive feature of organizational life that is 
expressed in many ways: the actions that people take (Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007; 
Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003), the clothes they wear (Slepian, Ferber, Gold, & Rutchick, 
2015; Bellezza, Gino, & Keinan, 2014), the postures they adopt (Park, Streamer, Huang, & 
Galinsky, 2013; Cesario & McDonald, 2013), the language they use (Wakslak, Smith, & Han, 
2014; Magee, Milliken, & Lurie, 2010), the feelings they have (Waytz, Chou, Magee, & 
Galinsky, 2015), the biases in their thinking (Schmid & Amodio, 2016; Goodwin, Operario, & 
Fiske, 1998), and even their physiological reactions (Mehta & Josephs, 2010; Schultheiss et al., 
2005) are all expressive of the amount of power that they hold within a group. Given the far-
reaching effects of power, it is not surprising that organizational scholars have highlighted its 
central importance with provocative statements such as “power is to the organization as oxygen 
is to breathing” (Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 2006: 3) and “every social relationship is a 
power equation” (Hawley, 1963: 422). 
 Abstract discussions of power are likely to conjure up stereotyped images of all-powerful 
CEOs governing a class of powerless underlings. Such caricatures fail to do justice, however, to 
the complex, interpersonal, and contingent nature of power relations that are commonly found in 
organizational life. In this paper, we propose a novel theoretical framework that takes a relational 
approach to understanding the psychological effects of power. We begin by recognizing that 




level of relative power. For some actors, the majority of interaction partners are relatively lower-
power (i.e., the actor consistently anticipates being in a position of high-power relative to others). 
For other actors, the majority of interaction partners are relatively higher-power (i.e., the actor 
consistently anticipates being in a position of low-power relative to others). Importantly, we 
identify a third group of actors that has been neglected in the literature – those who anticipate 
interacting frequently with both higher and lower-power others. We propose that individuals 
who are faced with these middle-power situations have unique psychological experiences that 
cannot be understood within existing conceptualizations of power, most of which focus 
exclusively on the experience of having or lacking power in an isolated situation. By virtue of 
repeatedly vacillating between upward and downward social interactions, we propose that 
individuals in a state of middle-power are more likely to experience role conflicts compared to 
those with more consistent vertical orientations. 
 While empirical investigations have documented the many ways in which people with 
more power think and behave differently than those with less power (for reviews see Anderson 
& Brion, 2014; Fleming & Spicer, 2014; Sturm & Antonakis, 2015; Galinsky, Rucker, & Magee, 
2015), the vast majority of these studies have ignored the experience of middle-power altogether 
and, to our knowledge, none has considered the psychological and behavioral implications of 
repeatedly vacillating between higher and lower-power interaction partners. Anicich (2016) 
recently reviewed 557 independent studies that either measured or manipulated a variable related 
to social stratification (e.g., power, organizational level, etc.) and found that information related 
to the middle of the distribution was reported in only 30 (5.4%) of the studies. Accordingly, the 
bulk of the available research is unable to inform our understanding of middle-power states.
1
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 Interestingly, of the 30 studies that did include information about the middle, 10 of them (33.3%) documented a 




 This shortcoming is particularly problematic because the types of individuals that are 
most likely to have the psychological experience of middle-power are crucial to organizations. 
Middle managers “act as the transmission belt between the top of the organization and the 
bottom” (Osterman, 2008: 66) and can have a strong impact on the bottom line. For example, in 
a large-scale analysis of the computer game industry, Mollick (2012) found that the behavior of 
middle managers accounted for 22.3 percent of the variation in revenue after controlling for 
project level predictors. Middle managers are particularly valuable in multiunit organizations, 
which face coordination, communication, and control challenges (Garvin & Levesque, 2008; 
McAfee, 2009). In fact, the Boston Consulting Group recently surveyed thousands of employees 
and devoted an entire report to better learn how to empower this “neglected but critical group” 
(Caye et al., 2010). Their findings revealed that 64 percent of employees said that middle 
managers were more critical to driving team member engagement than top managers were (Caye 
et al., 2010), which may help explain why Google decided to retain their middle management 
positions following an attempt to flatten their organizational hierarchy (Manjoo, 2013). 
 To begin to fill this gap in the literature, we situate our theoretical analysis of the 
psychological experience of middle-power by extending and updating the approach/inhibition 
theory of power (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), which is one of the most commonly 
cited frameworks for understanding the psychological and behavioral effects of power 
differences. Specifically, we develop novel propositions related to the psychological experience 
of middle-power by drawing from and integrating insights from role-based identity (Ashforth & 
Johnson, 2001; Stryker, 1980) and role transition (Ashforth, Kreiner, & Fugate, 2000) theories. 
Furthermore, we explain how our conceptualization of power extends the Keltner et al. (2003) 




reinforcement sensitivity theory (R-RST; Gray & McNaughton, 2000; McNaughton & Corr, 
2004).  Then, we apply this updated model to a diverse set of outcomes considered in past work 
related to power. Finally, we develop propositions about various contextual factors that influence 
the psychological experience of low, middle, and high power. Figure 1 provides an overview of 
our theoretical model. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 Our proposed framework is both practically relevant and theoretically motivated. From a 
practical standpoint, there is little doubt that organizational members vary in the extent to which 
they engage in vertical code-switching, which we argue follows directly from the bidirectional 
vertical orientation that underlies the psychological experience of middle-power. Understanding 
the psychology of middle power is thus critical for a deeper appreciation of how power relations 
affect people throughout the entire organizational hierarchy. From a theoretical standpoint, our 
framework precisely answers Anderson and Brion’s (2014: 85) call for more research on the 
“multiple coexisting roles that individuals play in organizations” such as when “a given manager 
is high in power in that he has asymmetrical control over his subordinates but is also low in 
power in that the manager’s boss has asymmetrical control over him.” We further respond to 
Sturm and Antonakis’s (2015: 157) call for researchers to address “the physiological 
underpinnings of power”, including “more automatic experiences, such as emotions.” Indeed, a 
central contribution of our model is the use of advances in neuropsychology to update and extend 
the approach/inhibition theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003), which draws on an outdated 
understanding of the motivational systems and emotions that are proposed to mediate the effects 




 Overall, our framework makes three important contributions to the social hierarchy 
literature: 1) We introduce middle-power as a unique psychological experience, rooted in the role 
conflicts that can emerge from frequent vertical code-switching, 2) We update and extend an 
influential theory of power on the basis of advances in the neuropsychological literature, and 3) 
We offer guidance to future researchers interested in testing elements of our framework by 
recommending novel strategies for measuring and manipulating power.   
MIDDLE-POWER AND VERTICAL CODE-SWITCHING 
 The study of power has a long and rich history in the social and organizational sciences 
(Blau, 1964; Clegg, 1989; Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 2006; Foucault, 1982; French & 
Raven, 1959; Lukes, 2004; Pfeffer, 1981; Weber, 1946). In the current paper, we define power as 
having asymmetric control over valued resources in social relations (Magee & Galinsky, 2008; 
Keltner et al., 2003; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). We focus specifically on the subjective sense of 
power and follow Tost (2015: 30) in defining it as “an individual’s internal mental 
representations of their power in relation to others in their social environments”. This in turn 
reflects the extent to which an individual believes that he or she possesses the “ability to control 
the outcomes, experiences, or behaviors of others” (Tost, 2015: 30; Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; 
Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012).  
 Two aspects of this definition are central to our framework. First, we take a relational 
approach to the study of power (Smith & Magee, 2015), focusing on one’s perceived sense of 
power in relation to others in one’s social network. Second, we treat power as a subjective 
psychological experience that is correlated with, but distinguishable from one’s structural 
position in a hierarchy (e.g., formal hierarchical authority, resource control, and network 




approach is also distinct from conceptualizations of power that emphasize larger units of analysis 
(e.g., departmental power, Perrow, 1970; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974; Crozier, 1964). In this way, 
we build on recent work that treats power as an interpersonal, state-based experience (Smith & 
Magee, 2015; Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012), and on past work that emphasizes the context-
specific nature of power (Pfeffer, 1981), such as Clegg’s (1989: 208) description of an episodic 
power circuit involving intermittent “power over another.”  
 According to our definition, individuals with a high sense of power are likely to perceive 
their current and future interaction partners as having less power than they do. Individuals with a 
low sense of power are likely to perceive their current and future interaction partners as having 
more power than they do. In other words, individuals with a high sense of power predominantly 
have a downward vertical orientation in relation to others, whereas individuals with a low sense 
of power predominantly have an upward vertical orientation in relation to others. What about 
individuals who do not have a dominant vertical orientation and thus cannot be easily 
demarcated as experiencing high or low power within a social system? 
Defining Middle-Power and Vertical Code-Switching 
 Individuals in these middle-power states, we propose, have a bidirectional (i.e., unstable) 
vertical orientation that emerges from the perception that one’s power is neither consistently 
higher nor lower than the power of one’s current or potential interaction partners. Roles and 
experiences that activate a bidirectional vertical orientation are thus likely to produce the 
psychological experience of middle-power to a greater extent than roles and experiences that 
activate a predominantly unidirectional vertical orientation.  
 One behavioral consequence of possessing a bidirectional vertical orientation is 




behavioral patterns that are directed toward higher-power and lower-power interaction partners. 
Code-switching has been discussed in linguistic (Heller, 1988) and cross-cultural (Molinksy, 
2007) contexts, but has not yet been considered in relation to organizational power dynamics. 
Importantly, the concepts of “middleness” and code-switching are crucially intertwined. 
Middleness refers to being an equal distance from the extremities of some dimension. All else 
being equal, as one approaches an extreme end of a variable’s distribution (e.g., relative power), 
the probability of encountering situations that require directional code-switching with respect to 
the underlying variable decreases. This fact is fundamental to our theoretical framework.  
 Consider a simple social network involving three employees who regularly interact with 
one another – A, B, and C. During their interactions, Employee A experiences a high sense of 
power in relation to both Employees B and C. Employee B experiences a high sense of power in 
relation to Employee C, but a low sense of power in relation to Employee A. Finally, Employee 
C experiences a low sense of power in relation to both Employees A and B. We propose that the 
bulk of the existing empirical and theoretical work in this area does not adequately describe the 
experience of Employee B as someone who possesses a bidirectional vertical orientation and 
therefore must regularly engage in vertical code-switching, feeling and behaving relatively 
powerful in one moment and relatively powerless in the next. While those at the higher or lower 
ends of a power distribution experience the same vertical orientation during most of their 
interactions, employees in a state of middle-power must repeatedly alternate between higher and 
lower power interaction patterns.  
 By introducing the concept of vertical code-switching, our framework holds the potential 
to increase our understanding not only of middle-power states, but also of low-power states. 




extreme power states, our framework allows for three relative comparisons – low/middle, 
low/high, and middle/high. As we detail below, many outcomes previously thought to be driven 
by the psychological experience of low-power (e.g., heightened inhibition) may in fact be driven 
by the psychological experience of middle-power.  
The Middle-Power Experience 
 There is abundant evidence that employees who occupy mid-level positions in an 
organizational hierarchy—those who are the most likely to possess a bidirectional vertical 
orientation—frequently encounter situations that require vertical code-switching.  
Giangreco and Peccei (2005: 1813) argue that middle managers are “simultaneously both the 
'victims' (targets) and the 'carriers' (agents) of change.” As a result, it is common for middle 
managers’ roles to suddenly change, while they are simultaneously tasked with implementing 
changes in the organization (Balogun, 2003; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1994). In this way, middle 
managers often find themselves caught in between various stakeholder groups (Keys & Bell, 
1982) and “enmeshed in a web of relationships generating relentless and conflicting demands” 
(McKinney, McMahon, & Walsh, 2013: 4). Consistent with this observation, Gleeson and Shain 
(1999) concluded that two of the primary challenges facing middle managers are 1) being caught 
in the middle between higher and lower-power individuals without sufficient support and 2) 
managing ambiguity relating to how they and others perceive their role in the organization. 
 Summarizing these perspectives, Floyd and Wooldridge (1994) articulated a 
comprehensive typology that succinctly describes the various role characteristics and demands 
facing middle managers (for an overview see pg. 50 of Floyd & Wooldridge, 1994). This 
typology describes four different middle management roles based on the type of influence 




middle managers are expected to frequently alternate among championing strategic alternatives 
(i.e., using upward influence and divergent thinking), facilitating adaptability (i.e., using 
downward influence and divergent thinking), synthesizing information (i.e., using upward 
influence and integrative thinking), and implementing deliberate strategy (i.e., using downward 
influence and integrative thinking). Accordingly, mid-level organizational positions demand a 
relentless capacity to engage in vertical code-switching. This leads to our first proposition:  
 Proposition 1: The psychological experience of middle-power will be associated with 
 frequent vertical code-switching.  
FROM VERTICAL CODE-SWITCHING TO ROLE CONFLICT 
 In this section, we develop the next link in our theoretical model – namely that vertical 
code-switching is associated with increased role conflict.  
 Individuals can occupy numerous social roles. The unique behavioral expectations or 
norms that are attached to each of these roles become activated in response to situational cues 
derived from the social context and one’s role in the interaction (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & 
McGarty, 1994; McCall & Simmons, 1966; Schmitt, Dube, & Leclerc, 1992; Stryker, 1968). 
Role conflict occurs when “the various social roles one is expected to perform provide 
incompatible behavioral prescriptions” (Hirsh & Kang, in press: 3; Rizzo, House, & Lirtzman, 
1970; Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Diedrick, & Rosenthal, 1964). Incompatible role prescriptions can 
emerge across or within distinct life domains. For example, heightened role conflict can result 
from incompatible work and family expectations (Greenhaus & Beutell, 1985), as well as from 
incompatible expectations associated with specific organizational roles (Rizzo, House, & 
Lirtzman, 1970). Within an organizational context, Rizzo, House, and Lirtzman (1970: 153) 




roles (e.g., frontline managers) are likely to face such conflicts more regularly due to being 
“caught in the middle (Roethlisberger, 1965) between conflicting demands from superiors and 
subordinates.” Consistent with our theorizing, these “boundary spanning” employees are 
especially likely to experience role conflict (Adams, 1976).  
 In addition to specifying behavioral expectations, roles also have implications for 
identity. Indeed, each role that an employee is expected to perform is associated with a distinct 
role identity — the “self-in-role” meaning that is ascribed to a particular role (Ashforth, Kreiner, 
& Fugate, 2000: 475). Importantly, social roles, identity, and relative power are inherently 
intertwined within an organizational context (Van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2004; Joshi & Fast, 
2013). The perception of oneself as a leader or subordinate in a given interaction reflects the 
adoption of a particular role identity, each of which has its own normative standards (Ashforth & 
Johnson, 2001). An employee is thus likely to enact the norms associated with being a 
subordinate (e.g., deference, respect) when interacting with a superior, but is likely to enact the 
norms associated with being a leader (e.g., assertiveness, dominance) when interacting with a 
subordinate.  
 We propose that managing the competing norms associated with these different roles and 
role-based identities can lead to increased role conflict (e.g., see Molinsky, 2007; Hobfoll, 2002; 
Jackson & Schuler, 1985; Tubre & Collins, 2000). Because individuals with a clear sense of low 
or high power are more likely than individuals with a sense of middle-power to retain the same 
hierarchical role across interaction partners, they will be less likely to face the challenge of 
balancing competing organizational roles and role-based identities. In a team context where 
individuals with a sense of middle-power may need to simultaneously interact with both higher 




Importantly, however, we do not view the simultaneous presence of higher and lower-power 
individuals as a necessary condition to produce role conflict among individuals in middle-power 
states. A similar psychological experience is likely to emerge when frequently alternating 
between incompatible roles with very different normative expectations (Molinsky, 2007; Hirsh & 
Kang, in press). Formally, we offer the following proposition: 
Proposition 2a: An increased frequency of vertical code-switching will result in a 
heightened experience of role conflict. 
 Figure 2 depicts the proposed relationship between vertical code-switching and role 
conflict. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 Although we propose that, in general, vertical code-switching will produce role conflict, 
this relationship likely depends on certain structural and intrapersonal characteristics. Below we 
consider two of these characteristics.  
 Hierarchical Steepness refers to the amount of vertical distance between formal 
hierarchical levels within a group (Bunderson et al., 2016; see also Harrison & Klein’s (2007) 
description of “separation” with respect to group member characteristics). Steepness has 
implications for the psychological experience of power because it affects the salience of power 
differences across the organization. Steeper hierarchies will amplify the experience of having 
power for those in high-power positions and amplify the experience of lacking power for those in 
low-power positions. For employees in mid-level positions, steeper hierarchies will increase the 
salience of both high and low-power roles, depending on the interaction partner. The normative 




discrepant from one another (e.g., Hirsh & Kang, in press; Molinsky, 2007). In this way, vertical 
code-switching is a type of micro role transition (Ashforth, Kreiner, & Fugate, 2000) that 
involves psychologically disengaging from one role and engaging in another role. In hierarchies 
that are low in steepness, vertical code-switching is a relatively low-magnitude role transition 
that is associated with only a small contrast in behavioral norms (Ashforth, Kreiner, & Fugate, 
2000). In hierarchies that are high in steepness, vertical code-switching is a relatively high-
magnitude role transition that is associated with a large contrast in behavioral norms (Ashforth, 
Kreiner, & Fugate, 2000). As the magnitude of the role transition increases so too does the 
psychological cost of “switching cognitive gears” (Louis & Sutton, 1991: 55). Thus, we offer the 
following moderating proposition: 
 Proposition 2b: The relationship between vertical code-switching and role conflict will  
 be stronger when hierarchical steepness is high. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
  
 Figure 3 depicts the proposed relationship between hierarchical steepness and the 
psychological experience of middle-power. 
 Thus far we have assumed that actors experience vertical code-switching as involving 
two distinct roles that are in conflict with one another. However, individuals differ in the extent 
to which they perceive role transitions as eliciting a sense of conflict between discrepant norms 
and identities (Nippert-Eng, 1996, 2008). These differences are related to the adoption of role 
integration or segmentation strategies, which reflect the extent to which a person’s various roles 
and identities are perceived as “compatible and integrated vs. oppositional and difficult to 




between social identity intersection and compartmentalization). Role integration and 
segmentation are commonly discussed in work-family (Rothbard, Phillips, & Dumas, 2005), 
cross-cultural (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005; Berry, 1997), and multiracial (Cheng & Lee, 
2009) contexts and have implications for a wide range of outcomes. Role integration in particular 
has been associated with cognitive flexibility (Mok & Morris, 2009), heightened creativity 
(Tadmor, Galinsky, & Maddux, 2012), and various indicators of well-being (Chen, Benet-
Martínez, & Bond, 2008).  
 To illustrate the distinction between role integration and segmentation strategies, consider 
two hypothetical mid-level employees: Susan and David. Both Susan and David have jobs that 
require them to frequently engage in vertical code-switching. Susan adopts an integrative 
strategy and thus views her roles and role-based identities during upward and downward 
interactions as highly compatible with each other, seamlessly enacting divergent behavioral 
scripts without hesitation, stress, or diminished performance. She experiences low role conflict. 
David, on the other hand, adopts a segmentation strategy and therefore views his upward and 
downward interactions as highly incompatible. As a result, David finds vertical code-switching 
to be difficult, exhausting, and unnatural. He experiences high role conflict. We formalize the 
outcome of this hypothetical situation in the following proposition: 
  Proposition 2c: The relationship between vertical code-switching and role conflict will 
be weaker among employees who adopt a role integration strategy and stronger among 
employees who adopt a role segmentation strategy.  
 Importantly, increased exposure to cross-role learning and acculturation opportunities 




Adam, & Galinsky, 2010), implying that the magnitude of the relationship between vertical 
code-switching and role conflict may be attenuated over time.  
 We have thus far proposed that the bidirectional vertical orientation that characterizes the 
psychological experience of middle-power is associated with frequent vertical code-switching 
and heightened role conflict. Next, we situate this model in the literature by updating and 
extending the approach/inhibition theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003). In doing so, we 
highlight the complex and contingent nature of power effects. 
REVISITING THE APPROACH/INHIBITION THEORY OF POWER 
 In this section, we draw on recent theoretical advances to a) examine how knowledge 
related to neural system activity has evolved since Keltner et al.’s (2003) approach/inhibition 
theory of power was published and b) propose that the role conflict stemming from the 
psychological experience of middle power is associated with activation of the Behavioral 
Inhibition System (BIS).  
 The highly influential approach/inhibition theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003) is based 
on the findings of Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST; Gray, 1982). According to RST, two 
distinct neural systems regulate responses to positive and negative stimuli. The Behavioral 
Approach System (BAS), which is supported by the brain’s dopamine system, is activated 
whenever cues to potential rewards are detected. Once activated, the BAS promotes the pursuit 
of these potential rewards, serving as the primary substrate of approach-motivated goal pursuit 
(Elliot & Thrash, 2002). A more responsive BAS is in turn associated with a greater sensitivity to 
positive stimuli and a reward-focused behavioral style (Depue & Collins, 1999). In contrast, the 
Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS), instantiated by the septo-hippocampal system, is the 




responsible for the slowing or cessation of goal-directed behavior in response to threat cues 
(Gray, 1982). When activated in response to potential threats, the BIS was proposed to suppress 
approach-oriented activity in the BAS, resulting in behavioral inhibition. Individuals with a more 
responsive BIS were in turn described as being more sensitive to potential threats in the 
environment, taking steps to avoid being subject to harm.  
 The approach/inhibition theory of power built upon this framework by arguing that high 
power states are associated with increased activity in the BAS, while low power states are 
associated with increased activity in the BIS (Keltner et al., 2003). Accordingly, individuals with 
more power were proposed to focus more on potential rewards and be less inhibited than those 
with less power. Although this theory has been very influential, and the prediction that powerful 
people tend to focus more on potential rewards has been well-supported (e.g., Anderson & 
Berdahl, 2002; Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Guinote, 
2007), changes to RST suggest the need to update the approach/inhibition theory of power. In 
particular, a revised version of RST was published in 2000 in the second edition of Gray’s 
influential book on the neuropsychology of anxiety (R-RST; Gray & McNaughton, 2000). Most 
central to this revision was the introduction of a new motivational system, the Fight-Flight-
Freeze System (FFFS). While the original RST regarded the BIS as being responsive to threats, 
this role is taken on by the FFFS in R-RST. Whenever a potential threat is encountered, it is the 
FFFS that gives rise to avoidance motivation, with the aim of escaping potential harm. The BIS, 
in contrast, is proposed in R-RST to be activated only during states of uncertainty (e.g., role or 
behavioral conflict), where the appropriate action is not clear. A situation that involves cues of 
both threat and reward, for example, can simultaneously trigger incompatible response 




conflicts, inhibiting ongoing behavior and initiating risk assessment until the appropriate action 
becomes clear (Hirsh, Mar, & Peterson, 2012).  
 In relation to our framework, having a predominantly downward vertical orientation (i.e., 
being in a position of high-power and enacting the corresponding behavioral norms) is associated 
with increased BAS activity whereas having a predominantly upward vertical orientation (i.e., 
being in a position of low-power and enacting the corresponding behavioral norms) is associated 
with increased FFFS activity. Importantly, having a bidirectional vertical orientation and 
engaging in vertical code-switching is associated with the presence of competing response 
options, leading to increased BIS activity in proportion to the amount of role conflict that is 
experienced (Hirsh & Kang, in press). Indeed, according to Corr (2010: 387-388), the BIS’s 
“principle function is to resolve the evolutionarily important conflict resulting from risk-aversion 
(FFFS) and risk-proneness (BAS).” We propose that having a sense of high or low-power 
decreases the salience of competing response options, thereby preventing activation of the BIS, 
which is an extension of Hirsh, Galinsky, and Zhong’s (2011) general model of disinhibition 
related to power.  
Activity in the FFFS and BIS are also proposed in R-RST to instantiate the distinct 
emotions of fear and anxiety, respectively. Although anxiety is often regarded simply as a milder 
form of fear, these are properly regarded as separate emotions with different motivational bases, 
pharmacological sensitivities, and behavioral consequences (Gray & McNaughton, 2000; 
McNaughton & Corr, 2004). Fear serves to motivate movement away from a specific threat 
(Cooper & Guynn, 2006; Lang, Davis, & Öhman, 2000; Macleod & Rutherford, 1992) and is 
therefore considered a short-lived arousal response (Davis, 1998). Anxiety, on the other hand, is 




presence of a generalized threat that is not currently observable (Blanchard & Blanchard, 1988, 
1990a, 1990b; Lang, Davis, & Öhman, 2000; Macleod & Rutherford, 1992) and is therefore 
considered a long-lived arousal response (Davis, 1998). As such, fear leads to immediate action 
(i.e., active avoidance behavior) in order to escape from an identifiable eliciting stimulus, 
whereas anxiety leads to a cautious scanning of the environment in search of additional 
information about the threat (see Berger & Calabrese, 1975). Trait fear and trait anxiety are 
similarly distinct from one another, reflecting sensitivities to threat cues on the one hand and 
sensitivities to behavioral conflict on the other (Sylvers, Lilienfeld, & LaPrairie, 2011). While 
the former is associated with heightened avoidance motivation, it is only the latter that is 
associated with tendencies toward behavioral inhibition (Perkins, Kemp, & Corr, 2007).  
Implications of R-RST for the Approach/Inhibition Theory of Power 
 According to publication records, the Keltner et al. (2003) paper was submitted for peer 
review in 1999, a year before the publication of Gray and McNaughton’s (2000) revised theory 
of the neuropsychology of anxiety. As a result, Keltner et al.’s (2003) understanding of the BIS 
was based, quite reasonably, on Gray’s (1982) original theory which was later revised on the 
basis of its poor differentiation between fear and anxiety. Indeed, the “specific changes made in 
2000 to the 1982 theory…have sufficient impact that the 2000 version should be read carefully 
as predictions cannot be based on prior knowledge of the 1982 version” (McNaughton & Corr, 
2004: 286). The most notable change is that the revised theory “provides a clear distinction 
between fear and anxiety” (McNaughton & Corr, 2004: 286). Specifically, Corr (2008: 47) notes 
that, “the revised theory treats fear and anxiety as not only quite distinct but also, in a sense, as 
opposites.” The lack of differentiation in Gray’s (1982) original theory is reflected in Keltner et 




individuals) and fear (mentioned six times in relation to low-power individuals). Other writing 
around the same time on this topic similarly treated fear and anxiety as interchangeable (e.g., see 
Lerner & Keltner, 2000: 483; “We measured state-fear with Spielberger’s (1983) state-anxiety 
scale…”). 
 The need to distinguish between fear and anxiety, reflected in the distinction between the 
FFFS and the BIS, also suggests the need to revise certain aspects of the approach/inhibition 
theory of power. Keltner et al. (2003) propose that individuals with low power control fewer 
resources and are thus more vulnerable to the various threats and punishments in their 
environment. Given the need to be more sensitive to such threats, low power individuals were 
proposed to experience heightened BIS activity. While this proposal was an appropriate 
extension of Gray’s (1982) original suggestion that the BIS responds to cues of punishment, it 
does not align with the revised formulation in which threat cues are processed by the FFFS. 
Using R-RST as a platform, the need for low power individuals to be more sensitive to cues for 
punishment should lead to heightened activity in the FFFS rather than the BIS. Because R-RST 
does not feature any changes with regard to the BAS, no changes are needed to the proposals 
about high power individuals that are contained in Keltner et al. (2003). Sensitivity to rewards 
and approach motivation function in identical manners in RST and R-RST. 
Integrating the Psychological Experience of Middle-Power with R-RST 
 If the sense of low power is indeed associated with the FFFS, how might the BIS relate to 
power in light of R-RST? As described above, the BIS responds to states of behavioral conflict 
and uncertainty, experiences which we argued are triggered by frequent vertical code-switching 
(see Proposition 2a). This reasoning implies that the experiences of high, middle, and low-power 




Importantly, we are not arguing that the behavior of individuals with a given sense of power is 
controlled exclusively by a single motivational system (e.g., that individuals with a low sense of 
power experience constant activation of the FFFS across all situations or that individuals with a 
high sense of power never experience fear). Rather, we build upon Keltner et al.’s (2003) 
framework in proposing that one’s relative sense of power will tend to differentially activate the 
brain networks identified in R-RST. Although power is often discussed in terms of structural 
positions in a hierarchy, it is more precisely the psychological experiences of power that result 
from these structural positions that will relate to the outcomes of interest. 
In the following sections we re-consider the Keltner et al. (2003) propositions related to 
BIS activation and make revised predictions based on our framework and the changes that were 
introduced in R-RST. Specifically, we re-consider the four categories of propositions Keltner et 
al. (2003) articulated in relation to BIS activation: 1) negative emotion, 2) attention to threats, 3) 
systematic, controlled cognition, and 4) inhibited, situationally constrained behavior. Overall, we 
propose that individuals with a sense of middle-power are prone to relatively high levels of BIS 
activation, whereas individuals with a sense of low-power are prone to relatively high levels of 
FFFS activation. We focus our attention on predictions related to low and middle-power states 
because the BAS is proposed to operate identically in RST and R-RST. Table 1 summarizes the 
differences between our framework and the Keltner et al. (2003) framework. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 Negative emotion. Keltner et al. (2003) proposed that activation of the BIS was 
associated with both fear and anxiety responses. On the basis of R-RST, we follow Gray and 




different neural systems – the FFFS and BIS, respectively. From this insight, our framework 
predicts that employees in middle-power states will be prone to higher levels of anxiety. We base 
this prediction on the argument that frequent vertical code-switching triggers role conflict, which 
is in turn associated with BIS activation (Hirsh & Kang, in press). In direct support of this idea, a 
recent epidemiological study of 21,859 full-time employees across a wide range of industries 
found that mid-level employees (i.e., supervisors and managers) reported higher rates of both 
short-term and chronic anxiety compared to low-level (i.e., workers) and high-level employees 
(i.e., owners) (Prins, Bates, Keyes, & Muntaner, 2015). Similar results have been observed in 
non-human primate populations, with mid-ranking female Barbary macaques exhibiting a higher 
and more variable anxious stress response compared to high and low-ranking females (Edwards 
et al., 2013). Furthermore, the role conflict that we propose results from frequent vertical code-
switching is a known antecedent of work-related anxiety (House & Rizzo, 1972; Jackson & 
Schuler, 1985; Van Sell, Brief, & Schuler, 1981). We can accordingly formalize our proposition 
about the emotional experience of middle-power individuals: 
Proposition 3a: Heightened experiences of role conflict among employees with a sense of 
middle-power will result in higher levels of BIS activation, as reflected in increased 
anxiety. 
 As in the original Keltner et al. (2003) model, employees with a sense of low-power can 
be understood as having reduced access to material and social resources, while also being more 
vulnerable to the threats and punishments that exist in their social environment. Employees with 
a sense of low-power are thus argued to require a greater sensitivity to threats in order to avoid 
potential harm. While we agree with this line of reasoning from the original approach/inhibition 




than the BIS as originally thought. Accordingly, the heightened sensitivity to threats that is 
proposed to characterize the psychological experience of low-power should be manifest most 
clearly in the emotional experience of fear, which reflects the desire to avoid harm, and not in 
anxiety, which reflects the experience of behavioral conflict and uncertainty. 
Proposition 3b: The greater sensitivity to threats required by employees with a sense of 
low-power will result in higher levels of FFFS activation, as reflected in increased fear. 
 It is important to note that we are not suggesting that employees with a sense of middle 
and low-power are constantly in states of extreme anxiety and fear, respectively. We do propose, 
however, that these emotional experiences will become more intense as the psychological 
salience of one’s relative power increases. Interactions with a superior that make an employee 
feel completely powerless, for example, are precisely the type of experience that will trigger 
feelings of fear as mediated by the FFFS. Similarly, those situations that highlight the experience 
of middle-power, such as interacting simultaneously or sequentially with subordinates and 
superiors, are the ones that will produce the greatest role conflict and thus be the most anxiety-
provoking. 
 Attention to threats. The type of negative emotion experienced by employees with a 
sense of low and middle-power is inherently connected to the nature of the threats that they face. 
Keltner et al. (2003) associated the experience of low-power with greater attention to threats and 
activation of the BIS compared to the experience of high-power. However, the distinction 
between anxiety and fear that was introduced in R-RST makes an important distinction between 
two different classes of threat (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). According to R-RST, the activation 
of the BIS supports the allocation of attention to diffuse and uncertain threats, whereas the 




Critically, this suggests that individuals with a sense of middle-power will be more likely to have 
a more broadly risk-averse mindset in which they frequently scan their environment for potential 
threats across a variety of contexts, whereas individuals with a sense of low-power will be more 
attentive to specific threats of harm (i.e., the possibility of punishment from superiors). We can 
formalize these propositions as follows: 
 Proposition 4a: Employees with a sense of middle-power will attend more to diffuse and 
non-specific threats. 
 Proposition 4b: Employees with a sense of low-power will attend more to specific and 
immediate threats.  
 An example of a diffuse and highly uncertain threat was the global financial crisis of 
2008 (Wolf, 2010; Taylor, 2009). If the heightened BIS activation associated with mid-level 
positions does indeed increase sensitivity to diffuse and uncertain threats, individuals in such 
positions should also have had the hardest time coping with the broader crisis. Evidence 
consistent with this prediction was found in a large-scale analysis of more than 1 million 
employee responses from Boston Consulting Group’s proprietary Engaging for Results database. 
In particular, middle managers experienced the largest drop in employee engagement following 
the 2008 financial crisis compared to pre-2008 engagement levels, when compared against 
relatively higher-power top managers and relatively lower-power team members (Caye et al., 
2010). This effect is consistent with the notion that the increased behavioral inhibition associated 
with the experience of middle power will also result in a greater sensitivity to environmental 
uncertainty.  
 Systematic and controlled cognition. Keltner et al. (2003: 274) proposed that, compared 




systematic and controlled cognition on the basis that “fear and anxiety are associated with 
vigilant, narrowed attention”. However, as described above, R-RST makes a clear distinction 
between the experiences of fear and anxiety and their associated cognitive processing styles 
(Gray & McNaughton, 2000). Building on this work, Corr (2010) has developed a model of 
behavioral control that associates the BIS with systematic and controlled cognition and the FFFS 
with automatic cognition, focusing on the active avoidance of aversive stimuli.  
 With respect to our framework, individuals with a sense of middle-power must negotiate 
the uncertainty inherent within their competing roles in the organizational hierarchy. Effectively 
navigating this uncertainty requires the engagement of more controlled and deliberative 
cognitive processing. Indeed, one of the major consequences of BIS activation is the allocation 
of attentional resources to help resolve the experience of behavioral conflict and uncertainty 
(Corr, 2010; Hirsh et al., 2012; Inzlicht, Bartholow, & Hirsh, 2015). While the original 
approach/inhibition theory of power suggested that low-power individuals would be prone to 
more controlled processing, as mediated through BIS activation, our revised model based on R-
RST proposes that this better characterizes the psychological experience of middle-power: 
Proposition 5a: Employees with a sense of middle-power will engage in more systematic 
and controlled cognition focused on reducing uncertainty. 
 Like the BAS, the FFFS is considered to be “well-suited to reacting to predictable stimuli 
from a pre-existing behavioural repertoire” (Corr, 2010: 385). Both the BAS and the FFFS thus 
support automatic and intuitive processing, with less emphasis on extensive deliberation and 
controlled cognition. The BAS, however, supports the automatic engagement of behaviors that 
will help to approach potential rewards, whereas the FFFS supports the automatic engagement of 




sense of low-power will have a relatively consistent upward vertical orientation across 
interaction partners, the social context will support and reinforce the automatic engagement of 
deferent and submissive behaviors. We can thus modify Keltner et al.’s (2003) prediction about 
the experience of low-power: 
 Proposition 5b: Employees with a sense of low-power will engage in more automatic 
behaviors focused on avoiding harm. 
 Inhibited and situationally constrained behavior. Keltner et al. (2003) argued that 
low-power individuals compared to high-power individuals are more constrained by 
situationally-dependent social norms. We agree with this conclusion, but it is informative to 
consider how the experience of middle-power may relate to social norm adherence. We have 
already discussed how vertical code-switching requires employees with a sense of middle-power 
to alternate between enacting competing role-specific norms, but what about organization-level 
norms that employees across all power levels are expected to follow? 
 Group norms are “the informal rules that groups adopt to regulate and regularize group 
members' behavior” (Feldman, 1984: 47). Not only do norms specify the expected patterns of 
behavioral conduct for group members, but they also help to express the central values and 
identity of the group (Durkheim, 1983; Elster, 1989; Parsons, 1951). Importantly, norms are 
critical sensemaking tools for organizational members (Weick, 1995), serving to reinforce and 
signal what is central to the group’s identity (Hackman, 1992). Therefore, under conditions of 
uncertainty, employees can adhere to well-known and practiced behaviors to reclaim a measure 
of certainty over their environment. In this way, norms can provide ontological security 
(Giddens, 1984) for organizational members who may be dealing with role conflict due to 




The benefits of adhering to organizational norms are likely to be especially appealing to 
employees with a sense of middle-power because doing so will attenuate their experience of 
uncertainty. Being uncertain about one’s role and role-based identity is an extremely 
uncomfortable experience (Baumeister, 1985; Fromm, 1941; Durkheim, 1951; Erickson, 1968; 
Sorrentino & Roney, 1986; Lopes, 1987) and humans are strongly motivated to reduce 
uncertainty (Hirsh et al., 2012; Hogg & Terry, 2000; Van den Bos, 2001, 2009), especially when 
it is perceived to be self-relevant (Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). According 
to uncertainty reduction theory (Hogg, 2000a, 2001a) and uncertainty identity theory (Hogg, 
2007, 2012a), one of the most common ways of reducing personal uncertainty is by identifying 
with a larger social group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 
1987; Abrams & Hogg, 2010). Experiences of uncertainty do indeed tend to result in stronger 
group identification (Grieve & Hogg, 1999; Mullin & Hogg, 1998; Reid & Hogg, 2005). Group 
identification helps to reduce uncertainty by revealing clear norms and expectations for behavior, 
thereby helping people to gain a sense of predictability and control over their environments 
(Hogg, 2007). Adhering to normative behavior in turn serves to reaffirm a person’s group 
membership, clarifying the self-concept and earning respect within the group (Hogg, Fielding, & 
Darley, 2005; Hogg, Hardie, & Reynolds, 1995). In this way, emphasizing one’s shared group 
membership by adhering to organizational norms can create a more predictable world when 
faced with uncertainty. 
 Although it is reasonable to assume that low-power employees will also strongly adhere 
to organizational norms due to the threat of punishment from higher-power others, there are 
reasons to predict that low-power employees may actually deviate from organizational norms to 




injustices and other frustrations—experiences we propose low-power employees are 
disproportionately likely to have—are common causes of workplace deviance (Bennett & 
Robinson, 2003; Mitchell & Ambrose, 2007; Robinson & Greenberg, 1998). Individuals also 
respond to social humiliation with retaliation even when the retaliator is punished for doing so 
(Brown, 1968; Bies & Tripp, 1996). Furthermore, when people believe that their organization or 
social system has disrespected them, they are less likely to adopt the norms of that organization 
or social system (e.g., Belmi et al., 2015; Colquitt et al., 2006; Mendoza-Denton et al., 2002; 
Tyler & Lind, 1992). Finally, meta-analytic results have demonstrated that low-level employees 
tend to be less identified with their organization than higher-level employees (Riketta, 2005). 
Identification with a social group is a key moderator of the extent to which people conform to 
any associated normative expectations (Christensen, Rothgerber, Wood, & Matz, 2004; Norman, 
Clark, & Walker, 2005; Terry & Hogg, 1996). Accordingly, employees with a sense of low 
power are likely to conform to organizational norms only when their behavior is easily 
observable to higher-power others who have the authority to punish them for deviating (cf. 
Barreto & Ellemers, 2000; Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004). In contrast, employees with a 
sense of middle-power are likely to adhere to organizational norms regardless of the social 
context because they are more likely to identify with the broader normative structure of the 
organization as a way to reduce role and identity related uncertainty (for additional information 
on this topic see Kelman’s (2006) description of the social influence processes of compliance 
and identification). Based on these arguments, we propose the following: 
Proposition 6: Employees with a sense of middle-power will be more likely than 
employees with a sense of low-power to adhere to organizational norms because their 




 Combined with the view that high-power is associated with elevated BAS activity and 
decreased adherence to situational norms (Keltner et al., 2003; Galinsky, Rucker, & Magee, 
2015), one implication of this proposition is that high and low-power states may both produce 
higher levels of deviant behavior relative to middle-power states, resulting in a U-shaped or J-
shaped pattern of results (e.g., see Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001).  
 It is also worth pointing out that the activation of the BIS is a dynamic process that 
changes with the relative salience of competing behavioral options. Specifically, the BIS 
becomes activated whenever a response conflict is detected, initiating risk assessment until the 
appropriate action becomes clear (Hirsh, Mar, & Peterson, 2012). Once the appropriate action is 
identified, however, the BIS will become disengaged in favor of the BAS or FFFS, guiding 
subsequent behavior toward the approach of rewards or avoidance of threats, respectively. The 
psychological consequences described above will accordingly be observed only when the BIS is 
activated by experiences of role conflict and uncertainty. If such role conflicts are resolved in 
favor of the sustained adoption of a particular vertical orientation (i.e., a clear sense of high or 
low power emerges), then the BIS will become disengaged in favor of the BAS or FFFS. As long 
as the role conflict persists, however, the BIS will remain activated.  
CONTEXTUAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In the previous section, we revisited Keltner et al.’s (2003) predictions in light of R-RST 
and our theorizing related to middle-power states. Given the complex and dynamic nature of 
organizations, however, there are undoubtedly numerous factors that moderate the relationships 
we have proposed above. Indeed, researchers have identified many individual and environmental 
factors that can influence one’s sense of power and its subsequent behavioral effects (Galinsky, 




Instead, we focus on three factors that relate to how one’s sense of power is structurally 
determined and psychologically experienced - power centralization, role boundary permeability, 




 Power centralization refers to the distribution of individuals across different power levels 
in a hierarchy. Highly centralized hierarchies take the shape of a pyramid, with fewer individuals 
occupying high-power positions and more individuals occupying low-power positions. All else 
being equal, power centralization reduces the probability that mid-level individuals will 
encounter situations that require vertical code-switching. In the context of a pyramid-shaped 
hierarchy, mid-level employees are likely to have far more contact with their (many) lower-
power subordinates than their (few) higher-power bosses, thus producing a predominantly 
downward vertical orientation (instead of a bidirectional vertical orientation). In contrast, 
hierarchies with less centralized power structures will have a more balanced number of higher 
and lower ranking employees, requiring mid-level individuals to engage in more frequent 
vertical code-switching. Thus, we offer the following proposition:  
Proposition 7a: Occupying a mid-level structural position in a hierarchy will produce the 
psychological experience of middle-power and lead to more frequent vertical code-
switching when power centralization is low compared to high. 
 Note, however, that even highly centralized hierarchies could require frequent vertical 
code-switching when mid-level employees must spend similar amounts of time communicating 
upwards and downwards. Nonetheless, power centralization is a useful proxy for the frequency 
with which upward or downward interactions must be made by mid-level employees.  
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 We recognize that there are undoubtedly additional structural and contextual factors that affect the relationships we 
have proposed, but for the sake of parsimony we only focus on four in the current paper. However, we encourage 




Role Boundary Permeability 
 The permeability of a role boundary refers to the degree to which an individual may be 
physically or psychologically engaged in more than one role simultaneously (e.g., see Ashforth, 
Kreiner, & Fugate’s (2000) description of role permeability). As discussed above, the roles of 
leader and subordinate each have a distinct set of behavioral norms and corresponding 
boundaries. In the context of our framework, highly impermeable role boundaries reduce 
opportunities for interactions across formal power levels within the hierarchy, whereas highly 
permeable role boundaries increase opportunities for interactions across power levels. 
Accordingly, when a hierarchy is comprised of vertical roles with highly permeable boundaries, 
individuals in mid-level positions, in particular, will be more likely to encounter situations that 
produce a bidirectional vertical orientation and require vertical code-switching. Thus, we offer 
the following proposition: 
Proposition 7b: Occupying a mid-level structural position in a hierarchy will produce the 
psychological experience of middle-power and lead to more frequent vertical code-
switching) when role boundary permeability is high compared to low. 
To reiterate, what matters the most with respect to our model is the psychological 
experience of power that these structural characteristics can affect.  
Subgroup Power 
 We have defined the sense of power as a subjective mental representation that one holds 
about one’s ability to control the outcomes, experiences, or behaviors of others. This mental 
representation is inherently dynamic, based on changing circumstances. Indeed, various 
environmental shocks can alter an individual’s sense of power. For example, group faultlines that 




subgroups with varying levels of power (Lau & Murnighan, 1998: 325; Carton & Cummings, 
2012). Larger subgroups tend to hold more power than smaller subgroups (Lau & Murnighan, 
1998), allowing them to exert their will more freely (Pfeffer, 1981). Given our interest in power 
dynamics, we focus here on resource-based subgroups (Carton & Cummings, 2012) such as 
coalitions, factions, alliances, or blocs (Finkelstein, 1992; Mannix, 1993; Li & Hambrick, 2005; 
Levine & Moreland, 1998). Although subgroups have often been discussed in the context of 
small teams, we view subgroups as operating similarly at larger units of analysis so long as 
subgroups “are characterized by a unique form or degree of interdependence” (Carton & 
Cummings, 2012: 441) among individuals within a larger collective. Crucially, subgroup power 
will influence the individual members’ sense of power, especially to the extent that membership 
in the subgroup is relevant to one’s day-to-day interactions and sense of self. Employees who 
would otherwise be in low-power positions when considered as individuals would thus have a 
very different experience of power if they belong to a powerful subgroup. Therefore, we 
propose: 
Proposition 7c: An employee’s sense of power will be influenced by his or her subgroup’s 
level of power, especially if membership in the subgroup is highly relevant to the 
employee’s day-to-day interactions and sense of self. 
 While we have focused on three potential moderating variables, any contextual factor that 
increases the experience of uncertainty will result in heightened levels of BIS activation, while 
anything that increases the sensitivity to threats will result in heightened levels of FFFS 
activation. Some of these factors will impact employees across all levels of an organizational 
hierarchy (e.g., an impending merger with uncertain implications for personnel), whereas others 




employees, thereby reducing their uncertainty and anxiety). The diversity and complexity of 
organizational life is such that there are numerous factors that will influence the experiences of 
employees. Critically, our framework is able to account for this diversity by proposing that it is 
the psychological experience of power that matters most for predicting downstream cognitive, 
affective, and behavioral consequences. Any factors that increase the experience of low, middle, 
or high power, regardless of an individual’s formal organizational position, are proposed to result 
in predictable downstream effects that are driven by activity in the FFFS, BIS, and BAS, 
respectively. 
DISCUSSION 
 In this paper, we have argued that the experience of middle-power, which we defined as 
the possession of a bidirectional vertical orientation associated with frequent vertical code-
switching, is a unique psychological state that is distinct from both high and low-power 
mindsets. We have sought to update and extend an influential theory of power (Keltner et al., 
2003) with the insights of R-RST in order to better accommodate the distinctions among the 
experiences of low, middle, and high-power. The distinction between the FFFS and BIS made in 
R-RST is a critical advance in our understanding of the neuropsychology of motivation, and we 
consider it to be an important extension of the approach/inhibition theory of power. With the 
addition of the FFFS as a distinct system that supports active avoidance of harm, the current 
framework might appropriately be termed as the approach/inhibition/avoidance (AIA) theory of 
power. While the predictions made by Keltner et al. (2003) about high power and the BAS 
remain unchanged in our model, the distinction between the FFFS and the BIS is an important 
theoretical advance because it allows for clearer predictions about the cognitive, emotional, and 




paves the way for future research to move beyond a simple high versus low power distinction 
when studying organizational hierarchies and their psychological consequences. 
Recommendations for Researchers Interested in Testing Our Theory 
 As with most theoretical models, the potential value of our framework hinges on the 
ability of researchers to empirically test our propositions. Current conceptualizations of power 
are not equipped to test the propositions outlined in this paper because they emphasize the simple 
distinction between high and low power states. We therefore propose that researchers draw upon 
the relational approach to power by assessing the frequency and intensity of an individual’s 
upward and downward social interactions. Given that the sense of power is proposed to derive 
from relational experiences, the quantity and quality of different types of vertical interactions 
should provide a behavioral metric of relative power. 
From a survey perspective, researchers may consider asking respondents about the nature 
of their vertical orientation or about the frequency of their upward and downward interactions 
within a particular social group (e.g., work group) or within their social network more broadly. 
Respondents who report engaging in frequent upward and infrequent downward interactions are 
likely to have a relatively stable sense of low-power in relation to others in their social network. 
Respondents who report engaging in frequent downward and infrequent upward interactions are 
likely to have a relatively stable sense of high-power in relation to others in their social network. 
Respondents who report engaging in frequent upward and downward interactions can be 
characterized as experiencing a sense of middle-power. This methodology could lend itself 
particularly well to detailed social network analyses if employees are asked to rate the frequency 
of their interactions with specific others, along with the salience of their hierarchical role in those 
interactions. To the extent possible, researchers should also consider assessing the structural 




boundary permeability), as these factors are proposed to affect the psychological experience of 
power. It is important to note that a strict cut-off approach to categorizing the experiences of 
high, middle, and low-power is neither realistic nor particularly informative. Rather, researchers 
should adopt a relative comparison approach which is consistent with existing conceptualizations 
of power. Related measures may also prove useful to test certain aspects of our model. For 
example, Jackson (2009) recently developed and validated five different scales to assess the core 
components of R-RST – the BAS, the BIS, and the Fight, Flight, and Freeze components of the 
FFFS. 
 From an archival perspective, researchers may be able to assess the frequency of vertical 
code-switching on the basis of network data. For example, an examination of email exchange 
patterns may reveal the extent to which employees communicate with others in relatively higher 
and lower positions in the hierarchy. In the absence of network data, researchers should consider 
using structural indicators of power (e.g., job title, salary level, number of direct 
reports/supervisors) as proxies for the psychological experience of power. In general, structural 
indicators of power are likely to be highly correlated with one’s psychological sense of power 
(although see Tost & Johnson, 2015; Bugental & Lewis, 1999; Tost, 2015 for examples of when 
this link may not hold).  
 From an experimental perspective, there is a strong need to develop valid and reliable 
manipulations of middle-power, given the importance of experimental research to the study of 
social hierarchy and the fact that a systematic review of 557 studies from the social hierarchy 
literature over the past ten years did not uncover a single experiment that manipulated middle-
power (Anicich, 2016). Manipulations that alter participants’ vertical orientation or actual or 




Some scholars may wonder if specifying that one has an average or moderate amount of power 
will produce the same psychological effect as specifying that one’s role affords a bidirectional 
vertical orientation and requires frequent vertical code-switching. This remains an open question 
and likely hinges on the extent to which one interprets possessing a moderate amount of power in 
a general sense as producing a bidirectional vertical orientation and requiring frequent vertical 
code-switching across interaction partners. Nonetheless, experimental manipulations of middle-
power are likely to be most effective when they simultaneously activate the conflicting 
normative expectations associated with relatively low and relatively high-power roles (cf. Hirsh 
& Kang, in press). 
 A final consideration that deserves empirical attention is the extent to which vertical 
orientation or code-switching measures of power correlate with existing measures of power. Do 
individuals whose scores on the sense of power questionnaire (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; 
Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012) fall in the middle of the response distribution also tend to be 
the individuals who possess a bidirectional vertical orientation and engage in frequent vertical 
code-switching? Are mid-level employees such as middle managers more likely to possess a 
bidirectional vertical orientation and engage in vertical code-switching than lower-level analysts 
and higher-level executives? On the basis of the theoretical arguments put forth in this paper, we 
would expect vertical orientation or code-switching measures of power to positively correlate 
with existing measures of power, but would also expect some of the moderators discussed above 
to affect this relationship.  
Power Versus Status 
We chose to focus our framework on the antecedents and consequences of an individual’s 




of power (Keltner et al., 2003). However, some may wonder if our framework may be applied to 
other stratifying variables such as status - the respect and admiration one has in the eyes of others 
(Magee & Galinsky, 2008). In general, power and status tend to be positively correlated (Magee 
& Galinsky, 2008) and both are highly relevant to organizations (Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 
2006; Aquino & Douglas, 2003). They are nonetheless distinct constructs (Magee & Galinsky, 
2008), as a number of empirical studies have recently demonstrated (Anicich, et al., 2016; Blader 
& Chen, 2012; Fast, Halevy, & Galinsky, 2012; Hays, 2013; Hays & Bendersky, 2015). 
Despite the differences between power and status, there is reason to believe that our 
framework could be similarly applied to status. Status judgments figure prominently in 
impression formation and social comparison processes because status is a product of and 
therefore relevant to social relationships (Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980). As a result, 
people are motivated to accurately perceive how much status they have in their groups 
(Anderson et al., 2006). Indeed, it is critically important for individuals to attend to the 
perceptions that others have of them in order to successfully navigate all aspects of their social 
world (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). This is especially true in organizations where 
hiring decisions, job assignments, and promotion decisions are overwhelmingly determined by 
the perceptions of others. Therefore, individuals seek to actively monitor (Leary, 1996; 
Schlenker & Pontari, 2000) and manage (Baumeister, 1982; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 
1995; Leary, 1996) the impressions that others have of them. According to the symbolic 
interactionist perspective (Mead, 1934), people form impressions of themselves based on the 
impressions that others have of them (see also the “looking glass self”; Cooley, 1902). When 
individuals are uncertain about the impressions that others have of them or their own abilities, 




1994; Buunk & VanYeperen, 1991; Weary, Marsh, & McCormick, 1994). According to these 
arguments, it is possible that middle-status employees, like middle-power employees, will 
experience role and role-based identity conflicts because their relative status in a given situation 
will fluctuate depending on the vertical direction of comparison.  
Two studies in particular highlight the potential value of considering middle-status 
effects more generally. Phillips and Zuckerman (2001), working from a sociological perspective, 
studied the behavior of Silicon Valley law firms and security analysts and found that middle-
status actors in both industries (based on proportion of attorneys who earned law degrees from 
prestigious universities and industry rankings of analysts, respectively) were more likely than 
their high and low-status counterparts to conform to industry standards (Phillips & Zuckerman, 
2001). More recently, Duguid and Goncalo (2015), working from a social psychological 
perspective, found that middle-status actors who were being evaluated were less creative than 
high or low-status actors. In other words, middle-status actors were more likely than high or low-
status actors to conform to well-known thoughts and practices under conditions of evaluative 
uncertainty. Overall, we would expect status to operate similarly to power in our framework, 
especially in contexts where status and power are highly correlated. 
Role of Peer Interactions 
 Central to our framework is the concept of vertical code-switching. As a result of this 
focus, we have yet to discuss the role of peer interactions, which occur between individuals who 
have the same level of power. We intentionally chose to minimize the role of peer interactions in 
our model because it is unlikely that two employees will experience precisely the same sense of 
power, even if they share the same formal power level in an organization. As the default form of 




will emerge even in the absence of formal power differences (for a review see Diefenbach & 
Sillince, 2011). Indeed, “one can find informal hierarchy at the same formal level of hierarchy” 
as group members “develop an unofficial ranking among their immediate work colleagues or 
peers” (Diefenbach & Sillince, 2011: 1521). Therefore, we would expect to see the emergence of 
hierarchy - reflected in varying senses of power among group members - even in organizations 
that espouse egalitarian principles and adopt egalitarian structures. Following the same logic, we 
would expect to see the emergence of a hierarchy within a single formal power level (e.g., 
among middle managers). In sum, peer interactions are subsumed within our model because we 
view peer interactions in the same way we view any other type of interaction – as having a 
vertical component. In truly egalitarian interactions, however, power should not be a salient 
dimension of the situation and thus should not have a strong psychological impact. 
Potential for Empirical Extension and Theoretical Integration 
 From an empirical standpoint, future research should seek to develop and test additional 
moderating hypotheses. For example, factors such as tenure at a given power level, level of 
organizational commitment, psychological safety, and perceived hierarchical stability may all 
affect an employee’s sense of power and the accompanying psychological and behavioral 
consequences. Additionally, organizational and national cultural values related to hierarchy (e.g., 
see Hofstede et al., 1990; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004; Anicich, Swaab, & Galinsky, 2015) may 
influence employees’ perceptions of and reactions to power. Specifically, frequent vertical code-
switching may have different implications for employees with a sense of middle-power in 
organizational cultures that endorse hierarchy compared to egalitarianism as a valuable and 




 From a theoretical standpoint, aspects of our framework (e.g., the implications of vertical 
code-switching and the insights of R-RST) may be usefully integrated with or considered 
alongside other theoretical frameworks. For example, researchers have begun to integrate work 
on approach/avoidance and regulatory focus theories with work on core self-evaluations (Ferris 
et al., 2011, 2013; Johnson, Rosen, & Levy, 2008), the “fundamental premises that individuals 
hold about themselves and their functioning in the world” (Judge, Erez, & Bono, 1998: 161). Our 
framework’s focus on vertical code-switching, role-based identity conflict, and the behavioral 
inhibition associated with middle-power may fruitfully be related to CSE’s core components of 
self-esteem, generalized self-efficacy, emotional stability, and locus of control (Chang et al., 
2012). More work examining these and other areas of overlap is a promising future direction.  
 Additionally, while the notion that individual characteristics can have curvilinear 
consequences dates as far back as Aristotle (trans. 1999), scholars have more recently 
emphasized the value of theorizing and testing for these effects (e.g., Le et al., 2011; Grant, 
2013; Grant & Schwartz, 2011; Pierce & Aguinis, 2013; Ames & Flynn, 2007). Importantly, a 
conceptualization of power that includes a consideration of the middle is required, at a minimum, 
to examine the possibility that power may have non-linear relationships with various social and 
behavioral outcomes. Because Keltner et al.’s (2003) model only differentiates between high and 
low power states, it cannot provide any guidance about the potential existence of non-linear 
effects. The current framework, however, provides the theoretical foundation from which 
researchers may begin to explore the consequences of the psychological experience of middle-
power.  




 Our framework is relevant to organizational practitioners. Specifically, our arguments 
that employees’ vertical orientation and frequency of vertical code-switching may be associated 
with negative downstream outcomes such as role conflict and anxiety suggest the need for 
organizational architects to consider the potential tradeoffs associated with various 
organizational structure or network decisions. Positions that unnecessarily elicit a bidirectional 
vertical orientation or require frequent vertical code-switching should be eliminated or re-
imagined to the extent possible. All else being equal, our framework implies that employees will 
experience less role conflict and anxiety if they have a single boss and multiple subordinates than 
if they have multiple bosses and multiple subordinates with whom they regularly interact. Our 
theorizing also suggests that organizational leaders would be wise to recognize that employees’ 
objective control over resources and their subjective sense of power may not always align. 
Although we have argued that, in general, structural indicators of power will be highly correlated 
with employees’ sense of power, this is not always the case. Therefore, from a practical 
standpoint, organizational leaders may be able to psychologically empower their employees 
without having to cede scarce resources to them. Finally, we have proposed that employees with 
a sense of middle-power who view their competing roles as integrated as opposed to segmented 
will experience less role conflict and anxiety (see Proposition 2c). Therefore, organizations may 
benefit from tailoring mid-level role descriptions and onboarding procedures to help develop an 
integrated and coherent identity. Explicitly tying middle-power duties to the broader 
organizational mission may help in this regard. 
CONCLUSION 
 Interest in social hierarchy research has grown immensely in recent years, but theoretical 




al.’s (2003) influential theory. In general, contrasting the experiences and behaviors of 
individuals who occupy opposite ends of a construct’s continuum is an intuitive entry point into 
studying any social scientific phenomenon. However, such a strategy may mask a more nuanced 
and, importantly, more accurate understanding of a construct’s relation to the outcomes of 
interest. By updating Keltner et al.’s (2003) approach/inhibition theory of power with the 
findings of R-RST, we were able to introduce a novel theoretical perspective related to the 
psychological experience of middle-power and vertical code-switching. We hope that our 



















THE MISSING MIDDLE IN SOCIAL HIERARCHY RESEARCH 
 In Chapter 1, I proposed a novel theoretical framework that attempted to introduce the 
psychological experience of middle-power into the social hierarchy literature. In doing so, I 
identified how my framework extended and revised the approach/inhibition theory of power 
(Keltner et al., 2003), a theory which has generated a massive amount of empirical research. In 
this chapter I highlight one consequence of Keltner et al.’s (2003) theoretical focus on extreme 
power states – a subsequent dearth of empirical work related to middle-power states. 
Procedure 
 To determine the frequency with which scholars have operationalized or modeled 
stratifying variables (e.g. power, status, expertise, etc.) to include a consideration of the middle 
of the distribution, I systematically reviewed the leading management and psychology journals 
over the past 10 years (2005-2014).
 3
 I reviewed studies published between January 2005 and 
December 2014 in four leading management journals (i.e. Academy of Management Journal 
(AMJ), Organization Science (OS), Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 
(OBHDP), and Journal of Applied Psychology (JAP)) and four leading psychology journals (i.e. 
Psychological Science (PS), Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP), Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin (PSPB), and Journal of Experimental Social Psychology (JESP)). 
Relevant studies were identified through searches conducted on individual journal websites and 
                                                          
3 In order to confirm my predictions that, in general, people conceptualize hierarchies as containing more than two 
rank levels, I asked a sample of adults on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (N=291, 39.9% female, mean age=30.90) to 
indicate how many layers or levels the typical hierarchy has. Specifically, participants read, “A hierarchy is a rank-
ordering of individuals along a valued social dimension. Think about the different types of hierarchies that exist in 
the world” and then responded to the following question, “How many rank levels or layers does the typical hierarchy 
have in your opinion?” The mean number of hierarchical levels reported was 6.25 (SD=6.61; mode=5 (37.8% of 
responses) range: 2 to 100), demonstrating that the vast majority of people do not adopt the stark comparison view 





Google Scholar by crossing hierarchical rank variable terms (i.e., authority, expertise, 
hierarchical, hierarchy, power, rank, reputation, SES, socioeconomic status, social status, and 
status) with common research terms and phrases (i.e., manipulate, manipulated, manipulation of, 
was manipulated, measure, measure of, measured, measurement of, measures of, was measured). 
These terms produced a total of 110 unique search combinations. I determined the final sample 
of studies by reviewing in detail the studies identified by my systematic literature review and 
cross-checking my sample with other reviews conducted on similar topics (Piazza & Castellucci, 
2014; Anderson & Brion, 2014; Fleming & Spicer, 2014; Sturm & Antonakis, 2015; Galinsky, 
Rucker, & Magee, 2015; Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015). I considered studies that 
manipulated or measured a stratifying variable. I put no inclusion restrictions on the outcome 
variable. Overall, the final sample included a total of 557 independent studies based on a 
combined sample of nearly two million observations (total N=1,971,431) from 226 published 
reports. See the Appendix for detailed information about each study reviewed. 
 After finalizing the sample of studies, I reviewed each individual study to determine if 
the study included any information about middle-rank subjects or observations (e.g., a scatter 
plot of the data, test of quadratic effect, inclusion of middle-rank experimental condition, etc.).  
Results 
 Only 5.4% (k=30 out of 557) of the reviewed studies provided information pertaining to 
the middle of the stratifying variable’s distribution. Of all the studies in the sample that 
manipulated a stratifying variable (k=392), 0% included a middle-rank condition (i.e., a 
condition that was explicitly intended to produce the experience of occupying a rank position 
spaced relatively equally between higher and lower-ranking others).
4
 The vast majority of studies 
                                                          
4
 Study 1 in Sauer, Thomas-Hunt, & Morris (2010) included high and average status conditions. However, in the 




that manipulated stratification only included high and low-rank conditions (e.g., participants 
were asked to assume the role of a boss or subordinate, or were asked to recall an experience in 
which they had power over someone or someone else had power over them, etc.) or included a 
control condition that was unrelated to the rank variable (e.g., participants in the control 
condition were asked to write about their day yesterday or their last trip to the grocery store 
instead of an experience related to power, or received no manipulation at all). 
 Of all the studies that measured a stratifying variable (k=179), only 16.8% (k=30) 
included the information necessary to determine if a curvilinear relationship was present between 
the stratifying variable and the outcome of interest.
5
 Of those 30 studies, 10 of them (33.3%) 
documented a clear nonmonotonic relationship between the stratifying variable and the outcome 
of interest. However, the vast majority of studies that measured a stratifying variable 
dichotomized the range of responses (e.g. by using +/- 1standard deviation from the mean) in 
order to examine an interaction effect with another variable or only reported the main effect of 
stratification on the outcome of interest without mentioning the results of the quadratic test. 
 Overall, my review of the literature confirmed that past work has overwhelmingly 
theorized and empirically assessed a linear relationship between stratifying variables and various 
outcomes while treating the middle of the rank distribution as a linear extension of high or low-
rank behavior. Importantly, considering middle-rank effects in social hierarchy research will 
benefit the field regardless of the analytical outcome because the interpretive precision will 
inherently increase when a finer-grained analysis is conducted. In other words, the interpretive 
blind spot (i.e., the middle) is reduced when the middle of a construct’s distribution is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
I coded this study as not including sufficient information to assess the effect of middle-rank on the outcome of 
interest. 
5
 The sum of k=392 and k=179 is greater than k=557 because a rank variable was both measured and manipulated in 




considered. In the next chapters, I move beyond theorizing and reviewing the literature to 
empirically examine the effects of high, middle, and low-power on one important outcome in 





In this chapter, I draw on Anicich and Hirsh’s (2016) extension of the approach/inhibition 
theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003) which makes important distinctions among the experiences 
and behaviors of individuals in high, middle, and low-power states on the basis of evidence from 
revised reinforcement sensitivity theory (Gray & McNaughton, 2000) to propose that the 
relationship between power and unethical behavior may not be linear as past research has 
suggested. Specifically, I predict that low-power individuals - who are proposed by Anicich and 
Hirsh (2016) to be fearfully motivated to escape from threatening situations - and high-power 
individuals - who are known to be self-focused and reward-seeking (Boksem, Smolders, & De 
Cremer, 2012; Gruenfeld et al., 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2008) - will engage in more unethical 
behavior than middle-power individuals - who are proposed by Anicich and Hirsh (2016) to 
anxiously demonstrate situationally constrained behavior as a means to reduce uncertainty. In 
short, I leverage Anicich and Hirsh’s (2016) framework to predict that a curvilinear relationship 
will emerge between power and unethical behavior. 
EVIDENCE OF MIDDLE-POWER MORALITY IN ORGANIZATIONS 
For decades, scholars have offered compelling yet contradictory evidence regarding the 
relationship between power and unethical behavior, which we define as “acts that have harmful 
effects upon others and are either illegal or morally unacceptable to the larger community” 
(Gino, Moore, & Bazerman, 2009: 8; Jones, 1991: 367). Some have proposed that it is the 
lowest-power members of society who are the most likely to behave unethically. For example, 
Tucker (1989) argued that marginal, low-level workers in organizations including fast-food 
workers (Hollinger, Slora, & Terris, 1992), taxi drivers (Sheahan & Smith, 2003), supermarket 




most theft. Additionally, poverty – a salient indicator of powerlessness – is a well-established 
(albeit complicated) correlate of crime (Merton, 1968; Becker, 1974). These findings are 
consistent with evidence suggesting that deprivation increases cheating (Gino & Pierce, 2009b).  
 However, there is a long history of offenses committed by society’s elite, from fraudulent 
financiers to corrupt CEOs, which suggests that the highest-power members of society are the 
most inclined to perpetrate unethical behavior (e.g., see Smith, 2012). In support of this notion, 
Piff et al. (2012) found that upper-class individuals behaved more unethically than lower-class 
individuals across a wide range of unethical behaviors (e.g., lying, cheating; see also Detert, 
Treviño, & Sweitzer, 2008). Furthermore, experimental evidence shows that corruption increases 
as one accumulates more influence in the form of additional followers (Bendahan et al., 2015), 
and when one has more power (Lammers, Stapel, Galinsky, 2010). Research in school settings 
also supports the idea that high-power individuals behave more unethically. Ellis and Zarbatany 
(2007) found that peer group centrality, a measure of a group’s power (Gest, Graham-Bermann, 
Hartup, 2001), was significantly and positively correlated with school misconduct (e.g., cheating 
on an exam) and overt aggression (e.g., instigating fights). Similarly, Galloway (2012) found 
evidence of greater cheating among students from advantaged backgrounds compared to students 
from less privileged backgrounds.  
 Building on these main effect findings, researchers have recently begun to consider more 
nuanced perspectives with respect to the relationship between power and unethical behavior. For 
example, Dubois, Rucker, and Galinsky (2015) found that social class positively predicted 
unethical behavior, but only when the behavior was self-beneficial. When the behavior was 
performed to benefit others, lower-class individuals were more unethical than higher-class 




findings see Wang & Sun, 2015). In another set of studies, Yap and Higgins (under review) 
examined the interactive effect of regulatory focus and power and found that two specific 
profiles led to the highest levels of corrupt behavior – high-power paired with a promotion-focus 
and low-power paired with a prevention focus, highlighting the potential value of considering 
individuals’ motivational orientations in addition to their level of power. 
 Importantly, however, none of these studies theoretically or empirically considered 
middle-power effects. By primarily focusing on a linear relationship between power and 
unethical behavior (or interactive effects of power and other variables on unethical behavior), 
past work has potentially masked a more accurate interpretation that can only be identified by 
considering a curvilinear relationship, which requires at a minimum, a comparison of three 
power levels.  
Over the next two chapters, I present initial evidence for a middle-power-morality effect, 
the tendency for middle-power actors in a hierarchy to behave more ethically than their higher 
and lower-power counterparts. In this chapter (Studies 1-3), I examine middle-power morality in 
an organizational context from the perspective of observers as well as actors. Additionally, I 
identify different mechanisms driving unethical behavior for low-power individuals (i.e., identity 
threat) and high-power individuals (i.e., sense of entitlement) which are consistent with Anicich 
and Hirsh’s (2016) theorizing. In the next chapter (Studies 4-6), I examine middle-power 
morality in the context of society more broadly (i.e., from a social class perspective) and identify 
one’s subjective standing (as opposed to one’s objective control over resources) as the key factor 
driving the middle-power morality effect. 
 
Study 1: Power and Unethical Behavior Among Coworkers (DV #1) 
 In Study 1, we collected data from two unique samples. We used the responses from the 




We then asked participants from a second sample to list three coworkers with differing levels of 
power (i.e., high, middle, and low) and indicate which coworker was most likely to engage in 
each behavior.  
 Sample 1. One-hundred twenty-three participants who were employed full-time were 
recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (age M=32.93, SD=10.83, 38% women) and 
received a small wage for participating.  
 Methods (Sample 1). Participants were asked to, “Please enter 5 different unethical 
behaviors that may occur in organizations. Be as specific as possible and try to include a wide 
range of unethical behaviors.” 
 Results (Sample 1). Participants reported a total of 615 unethical behaviors (123 
participants × 5 unethical behaviors each), which we closely examined in order to identify the 
most common categories of behaviors. Our analysis revealed five categories of behaviors that 
were consistently reported by participants. Those five categories were: Theft (27.48% of all 
responses; e.g., stealing company supplies or information; embezzlement), Lying (10.08% of all 
responses; e.g., to others in the organization, customers, or the public), Discrimination (8.29% of 
all responses; e.g., sexism, racism, favoritism), Harassment (6.99% of all responses; e.g., sexual 
harassment), and Bribery (2.93% of all responses; e.g., receiving or offering a bribe). We 
therefore used these five categories of behaviors for our measures of unethical behavior in the 
second part of this study.
6
 
 Sample 2. One-hundred ninety-nine participants who were employed full-time were 
recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (age M=30.07, SD=8.57, 39% women) and 
received a small wage for participating. Twenty-seven participants failed an attention check and 
were excluded from all analyses, reducing the final sample size to one-hundred seventy-two.  
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 Methods (Sample 2). Participants were asked to list three coworkers with varying levels 
of power (i.e., high, average, and low) and then indicate which of the three coworkers was most 
likely to commit each of the five most common unethical behaviors that the first sample of 
participants produced. Specifically, participants read the following: 
Please enter the first name or initials of someone in your organization who has very 
high power – that is, someone who has a great deal of influence and authority in your 
organization and who is near the top [an average amount of power – that is, someone 
who has an average amount of influence and authority in your organization and who is 
near the middle] [very low power – that is, someone who has hardly any influence and 
authority in your organization and who is near the bottom] of the organizational 
hierarchy. 
After identifying the three coworkers, participants were directed to a different screen and  
read the following: 
Think about the three people you listed on the previous page and the types of behaviors 
that they engage in or would engage in if given the opportunity. 
 
Below are five different unethical behaviors. Please click and drag each behavior into 
one of the three boxes according to which person is most likely to engage in that 
particular behavior if presented with the opportunity? 
You may place as many or as few behaviors as you would like in each of the three boxes 
on the right. That is, a person’s box may include all, some, or none of the behaviors. 
Using the computer interface, participants then allocated the unethical behaviors among their 
coworkers by dragging and dropping each of the five unethical behaviors into one (or none) of 
the coworkers’ boxes. One coworker name was piped into each box in the following way, 
“[Coworker name] is the one most likely to engage in the following behavior(s):” 
---------------------------------------- 






 Results (Sample 2). We predicted that participants would assign fewer unethical 
behaviors to their middle-power coworkers than to either their high or low-power 
coworkers.  
 To account for the fact that allocation decisions were not independent because 
participants made repeated allocation decisions using a fixed number of unethical behaviors, 
we ran a series of paired-samples t-tests. As predicted, the number of unethical behaviors 
assigned to middle-power coworkers (M=1.16, SD=1.14) was significantly lower than the 
number of unethical behaviors assigned to high-power coworkers (M=1.82, SD=1.36), 
t(171) = 4.10, p <.001, d=0.53, and the number of unethical behaviors assigned to low-
power coworkers (M=1.59, SD=1.27), t(171) = 2.97, p =.003, d=0.36. The number of 
unethical behaviors assigned to high and low-power coworkers did not significantly differ, 
t(171) = 1.38, p =.17, d=0.18.  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 The results of Study 1 provide initial support for our middle-power morality 
hypothesis. Organizational members identified middle-power coworkers as being less 
unethical than both higher and lower-power coworkers. In the next study, we sought to 
replicate this finding using a different measure of unethical behavior. 
Study 2: Power and Unethical Behavior Among Coworkers (DV #2) 
 The findings from Study 1 leave open an important theoretical question. Is middle-power 
morality simply the result of high-power people engaging in unethical acts that they have 
disproportionate opportunity or desire to commit (e.g., discrimination) and low-power people 
engaging in unethical acts that they have disproportionate opportunity or desire to commit (e.g., 




behaviors” that when considered together appear to produce a middle-power effect. Alternatively 
or in addition, there may be something unique about the psychological experience of middle-
power that leads to less unethical behavior. Both accounts are plausible and likely to be true to 
some extent. We take the perspective that holding the opportunity and desire to commit a 
specific unethical behavior constant across power levels, the psychological experience of middle-
power will have a unique inhibitory effect on unethical behavior, whereas the psychological 
experiences of high and low-power will license unethical behavior, but for different reasons 
(e.g., see Anicich & Hirsh, 2016). Therefore, in Studies 2 and 3 we deliberately focused on 
behaviors that could reasonably be committed by an employee with any amount of power.  
 Sample. One-hundred seventeen participants who were employed full-time were recruited 
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (age M=33.07, SD=9.81, 45% women) and received a small 
wage for participating. Twelve participants failed an attention check and were excluded from all 
analyses, reducing the final sample size to one-hundred and five. 
 Methods. Participants received the same instructions as described in Study 2. 
Specifically, they were asked to list three coworkers with varying levels of power (i.e., high, 
average, and low) and then indicate which of the three coworkers was most accurately described 
by each of four different unethical adjectives that could be reasonably applied to employees with 
any amount of power in an organization – backstabbing, immoral, improper, and dishonest. As in 
Study 1, after identifying the three coworkers, participants were directed to a different screen and 
completed an adjective-coworker allocation task. Using the computer interface, participants then 
allocated the unethical adjectives among their coworkers by dragging and dropping each of the 




piped into each box in the following way, “Compared to the other two people, [coworker name] 
is the most…” 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 Results. We predicted that participants would assign fewer unethical adjectives to their 
middle-power coworkers than to either their high or low-power coworkers.  
 To account for the fact that allocation decisions were not independent because 
participants made repeated allocation decisions using a fixed number of unethical adjectives, 
we ran a series of paired-samples t-tests. As predicted, the number of unethical adjectives 
assigned to middle-power coworkers (M=0.94, SD=0.91) was significantly lower than the 
number of unethical adjectives assigned to high-power coworkers (M=1.47, SD=1.30), 
t(104) = 2.89, p =.005, d=0.47, and marginally lower than the number of unethical adjectives 
assigned to low-power coworkers (M=1.23, SD=1.23), t(104) = 1.72, p =.088, d=0.27. The 
number of unethical adjectives assigned to high and low-power coworkers did not 
significantly differ, t(104) = 1.09, p =.28, d=0.19.  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 The results of Study 2 replicated the initial middle-power morality effect found in 
Study 1 using a set of unethical behaviors that anyone in an organizational context could 
reasonably engage in. 
Study 3: Identity Threat and Psychological Entitlement Drive Unethical Behavior Among 
Low and High-Power Individuals 
 In Studies 1 and 2 we demonstrated that individuals believe that their low and high-power 




goals. First, we sought to replicate these findings, but from the actor’s perspective. Second, we 
manipulated power in an organizational context in order to establish initial evidence of causality. 
Third, we sought to identify two potential mediators that drive the middle-power morality effect 
– identity threat among low-power individuals and psychological entitlement among high-power 
individuals. 
 We follow Aquino and Douglas (2003: 196) in defining identity threat as “any overt 
action by another party that challenges, calls into question, or diminishes a person’s sense of 
competence, dignity, or self-worth.” We focus on identity threat as a potential mediator of the 
effect of power on unethical behavior among low-power employees because low-power 
employees, in particular, are disproportionately likely to be on the receiving end of identity 
threatening actions (for a review see Tepper, 2007), such as unfair treatment (Schminke, 
Cropanzano, & Rupp, 2002). We propose that experiencing identity threat can lead employees to 
endorse unethical behavior. This prediction is consistent with Anicich and Hirsh’s (2016) 
assertion that low-power states are associated with active escape from threatening situations and 
activation of the fight-flight-freeze system (FFFS). Indeed, being the target of identity 
threatening acts such as social humiliation has been shown to lead to retaliation even among low-
power employees who may be punished for responding in this way (Brown, 1968; Bies & Tripp, 
1996). These findings are consistent with evidence demonstrating that individuals respond to 
social exclusion (Twenge et al., 2001) and threatened social worth (Davis & Reyna, 2015) – 
experiences we argue low-power people are disproportionately likely to have - with aggression. 
Additionally, when individuals feel disrespected, they are more likely to reject the norms 




Mendoza-Denton et al., 2002; Lind & Tyler, 1992), a reaction we propose could extend to ethical 
norms. 
 We follow Campbell et al. (2004: 31) in defining psychological entitlement as “a stable 
and pervasive sense that one deserves more and is entitled to more than others.” Past work has 
demonstrated that having power is associated with an increased sense of entitlement (De Cremer 
& Van Dijk, 2005; Van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006; Piff, 2014; Major, 1994; Kipnis, 1972) which 
we propose, in turn, may drive unethical behavior among powerful individuals. When powerful 
individuals are confronted with something they desire, but do not currently possess, we propose 
that they have the means (i.e., asymmetric control over valued resources, Magee & Galinsky, 
2008) and psychological disposition (i.e., sense of entitlement, approach motivation) to pursue 
the object of their desire even if acquiring it requires engaging in unethical behavior. This 
prediction is consistent with arguments that high-power states are associated with self-interested 
approach motivation and activation of the behavioral approach system system (BAS; e.g., see 
Keltner et al., 2003; Anicich & Hirsh, 2016). Furthermore, high-power individuals compared to 
low-power individuals are more sensitive to being treated unfairly and more likely to take action 
in response to perceived injustices (Sawaoka, Hughes, & Ambady, 2015), which could also 
license unethical behavior. 
 Sample. Two-hundred and three participants who were employed full-time were recruited 
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (age M=34.36, SD=12.08, 49% women) and received a 
small wage for participating. Four participants failed an attention check and were excluded from 
all analyses, reducing the final sample size to one-hundred ninety-nine. 
 Power Manipulation. To manipulate the psychological experience of power, we 




presented participants with an employee biography page that revealed their job title (Research 
Analyst, Middle-Manager, or Senior Vice President), salary grade within the organization (1 out 
of 13 (i.e., bottom), 7 out of 13 (i.e., middle), or 13 out of 13 (i.e., top)), job responsibilities (e.g., 
“Adopt the company strategy that is handed down from middle managers,” “Communicate and 
implement company strategy to research analysts,” or “Develop company strategy and 
communicate this strategy to the middle managers”), a summary of their role (e.g., “Your low-
rank is reflected in your very small salary and complete lack of power within the organization,” 
“Your middle-rank is reflected in your mid-range salary and marginal amount of power within 
the organization,” or “Your high-rank is reflected in your very large salary and substantial 
amount of power within the organization”), and a visual depiction of their standing in the 
organizational chart. To enhance the realism of our role manipulation, we also presented 
participants with a “Snapshot of your life” which included images of participants’ cubicle/office, 
apartment/house, and car on a subsequent screen. We selected images that reflected three distinct 
experiences of power based on our definition of power as asymmetric control over valued 
resources (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). See Figure XX for the complete set of stimuli presented to 
participants.  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 8 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 After reviewing this information, participants wrote about an average day in their life. 
Specifically, participants read: 
Now, please take a few minutes to describe an average day in your life. How would you 
think, feel, and act as someone in this role? Please write roughly one paragraph. 
 




 Anticipated Identity Threat Mediator. We assessed anticipated identity threat by asking 
participants how often they thought other individuals in the organization would treat them in nine 
different ways (α=0.93; e.g., “criticizing you unfairly”; adapted from Aquino & Douglas, 2003). 
We predicted that anticipated identity threat would drive anticipated unethical behavior among 
low-power employees. See Table 2 for a complete list of the items contained in the identity 
threat and psychological entitlement measures. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 Anticipated Psychological Entitlement Mediator. We assessed anticipated psychological 
entitlement by asking participants to indicate their level of agreement with nine different 
statements (α=0.93; e.g., “I honestly feel I’m just more deserving than others”; Campbell et al., 
2004). We predicted that anticipated psychological entitlement would drive unethical behavior 
among high-power employees. 
 Anticipated Unethical Behavior Dependent Variable. Participants were asked to reflect 
on their role in the organization and indicate the extent to which the following five adjectives 
describe them: “asocial,” immoral,” “improper,” “rude,” and “well-mannered” (reverse-scored) 
(α=0.79; Van Kleef et al., 2011; from 1=“Definitely not” to 7=“Definitely”). Although this 
measure was originally used by Van Kleef et al. (2011) as a measure of norm violation, we view 
the items as containing an ethical component based on our definition of unethical behavior as 
“acts that have harmful effects upon others and are either illegal or morally unacceptable to the 
larger community” (Gino, Moore, & Bazerman, 2009: 8; Jones, 1991: 367). For example, 
according to the Oxford English dictionary, asocial refers to being “inconsiderate of or hostile to 




morality or honesty,” and rude reflects “offensively impolite or ill-mannered” behavior. 
Consistent with these arguments, a review of the antecedents and consequences of norm-
violating behaviors was recently featured in a special journal issue on morality and ethics (van 
Kleef et al., 2015). 
 Results. First we tested the effect of power on our proposed mediators – anticipated 
identity threat and psychological entitlement. As predicted, participants in low-power roles 
(M=2.75, SD=0.73) reported higher levels of anticipated identity threat than participants in both 
middle-power roles (M=2.18, SD=0.78), t(196) = 4.11, p <.001, d=0.75, and high-power roles, 
(M=2.13, SD=0.90), t(196) = 4.43, p <.001, d=0.76. Participants in middle-power roles and high-
power roles did not differ in their reported levels of anticipated identity threat, t(196) = -0.34, p 
=.74, d=0.06. Furthermore, participants in high-power roles (M=4.29, SD=1.60) reported higher 
levels of anticipated psychological entitlement than participants in both middle-power roles 
(M=3.56, SD=1.37), t(196) = 2.99, p =.003, d=0.49, and low-power roles, (M=3.69, SD=1.20), 
t(196) = 2.50, p =.013, d=0.43. Participants in middle-power roles and low-power roles did not 
differ in their reported levels of anticipated psychological entitlement, t(196) = 0.55, p =.58, 
d=0.10. 
 We then tested the effect of power on our dependent variable - anticipated unethical 
behavior. As predicted, participants in both low-power roles (M=2.36, SD=1.12), t(196) = 2.32, p 
=.021, d=0.44, and high-power roles (M=2.36, SD=1.24), t(196) = 2.28, p =.024, d=0.41, 
reported anticipating engaging in more unethical behavior than participants in middle-power 
roles (M=1.93, SD=0.77). Participants in low-power roles and high-power roles did not differ in 




 Mediation Analyses. To test our hypotheses that identity threat drives the effect of 
unethical behavior among low-power participants and that psychological entitlement drives the 
effect of unethical behavior among high-power participants, we used Hayes’s (2012) PROCESS 
script to calculate direct and indirect effects using a multicategorical predictor (Hayes & 
Preacher, 2014). Following the recommendations of Hayes and Preacher (2014), we created one 
dummy variable distinguishing high-power participants (coded 1) from the rest (coded 0) and a 
second dummy variable distinguishing low-power participants (coded 1) from the rest (coded 0).  
 To assess identity threat as the mediator, we ran two analyses – one with the high-power 
(versus others) dummy as the predictor and the low-power (versus others) dummy as a covariate 
and a second with the low-power (versus others) dummy as the predictor and the high-power 
(versus others) dummy as a covariate. We followed the same procedure to assess psychological 
entitlement as the mediator.  
 As predicted, a bootstrapping procedure with 5,000 resamples indicated that identity 
threat fully mediated the effect of condition on unethical behavior when power was low (vs. 
middle; 95% bias-corrected CI: 0.086 to 0.375), but did not mediate the effect of condition on 
unethical behavior when power was high (vs. middle; 95% bias-corrected CI: -0.110 to 0.098). 
Additionally, a bootstrapping procedure with 5,000 resamples indicated that psychological 
entitlement fully mediated the effect of condition on unethical behavior when power was high 
(vs. middle; 95% bias-corrected CI: 0.006 to 0.248), but did not mediate the effect of condition 
on unethical behavior when power was low (vs. middle; 95% bias-corrected CI: -0.027 to 0.102). 
The results of Study 3 provide initial causal evidence in support of our middle-power morality 




participants assigned to a low-power role vs. middle) and psychological entitlement (among 
participants assigned to a high-power role vs. middle). 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 9-10 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 In this chapter, I provided initial evidence of middle-power morality within an 
organizational context. In the next chapter, I test the middle-power morality hypothesis in society 





EVIDENCE OF MIDDLE-CLASS MORALITY IN SOCIETY 
 In this chapter, I extend my investigation of middle-power morality from the 
organizational context to the societal context by treating social class as a proxy for power. 
Individuals from higher social classes, by definition, have greater control over valued resources 
(e.g., money, education, opportunities) which can activate a higher sense of power more 
generally (Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2015; Galinsky, Rucker, & Magee, 2015). However, 
structural indicators of power (e.g., social class) do not always lead to a higher sense of power 
(for a review see Tost, 2015). One potential explanation for this discrepancy relates to power 
being inherently relational (Smith & Magee, 2015). Power does not exist in a vacuum, devoid of 
social context. Rather, one’s sense of power depends on one’s self-perceived ability to control 
the outcomes, experiences, or behaviors of others. Importantly, a relational understanding of 
power implies that one’s sense of power is more strongly influenced by one’s immediate or local 
social context compared to the broader societal context in which one may be embedded. This 
reasoning is consistent with seminal work showing that one’s perceived social standing depends 
crucially on one’s reference group (Hyman, 1942) and self-relevant social comparisons 
(Festinger, 1954). Therefore, I predict that one’s social class will more strongly influence one’s 
sense of power and in turn behavior when it is construed subjectively and relationally (as 
opposed to objectively and globally).  
Study 4: Which social class is believed to be the most unethical in society? 
 Before testing the prediction outlined above, I sought to establish that people generally 




 Sample. Two-hundred and six participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (age M=30.57, SD=9.67, 45% women) and received a small wage for participating. Nine 
participants failed an attention check and were excluded from all analyses, reducing the final 
sample size to one-hundred and ninety-seven. 
 Methods. Participants read the following: 
In general, the social hierarchy of the United States is made up of people who occupy 
one of three different social classes - the upper class, the middle class, and the lower 
class. 
 
People in the upper class have more power, resources, and influence than people in the 
lower class and people in the middle class. 
 
People in the middle class have less power, resources, and influence than people in the 
upper class, but more power, resources, and influence than people in the lower class. 
 
People in the lower class have less power, resources, and influence than people in the 
upper class and people in the middle class. 
 
In your opinion, which group of people is most likely to engage in unethical behavior 
ignoring the fact that some classes of individuals have more members than others in 
society and that people from different classes may have different motivations for 
behaving unethically? By unethical behavior, we mean acts that have harmful effects 
upon others and that are either illegal or morally unacceptable to the larger 
community. 
Participants then indicated which of the three social classes they viewed as being the most  
Unethical – the upper class, the middle class, or the lower class. 
 Results. As predicted, a non-parametric chi-square test revealed that participants viewed 
the middle class as the most unethical social class less frequently than would be expected based 
on the expectation that all three social classes are believed to be the most unethical at equivalent 
rates (n = 22 chose middle class vs. n = 61 and n = 114 chose lower class and upper class, 
respectively), χ
2




the frequencies of lower class and middle class selection was also significant, χ
2
(1) = 18.33, p 
<.001.  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 11 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 In the next two studies, I seek to determine if this intuition that middle-class individuals 
are less unethical than upper and lower class individuals is true using the results of two large-
scale social surveys. 
Study 5: Evidence of Middle-Class Morality from the World Values Survey (WVS) 
 In the previous study, we found that people generally view middle-class individuals as 
more ethical than upper and lower class individuals. In this study, we sought to directly test this 
collective intuition using the results from the World Values Survey (WVS). Specifically, we 
assessed respondents’ social class as a predictor of how justifiable respondents considered a 
range of unethical behaviors to be. Furthermore, we distinguished between subjective and 
objective social class, predicting stronger effects in relation to subjective social class.  
 Sample. The WVS consists of nationally representative surveys conducted across the 
globe. We used the sixth and most recent wave of data (2010-2014). Wave 6 is the only wave 
that included all of the relevant variables used in the current study. Our final sample included 
responses collected in 57 countries over a five-year period (2010-2014) from 76,834 respondents 
(52% female; age M=41.6, SD=16.3).
7
 Using the WVS data allows us to generalize our findings 
                                                          
7
 The 57 countries represented in our sample were: Algeria (N=935), Azerbaijan (N=999), Argentina (N=845), 
Australia (N=993), Armenia (N=1,020), Brazil (N=1,393), Belarus (N=1,487), Chile (N=802), China (N=1,542), 
Taiwan (N=1,074), Colombia (N=1,443), Cyprus (N=932), Ecuador (N=1,195), Estonia (N=1,310), Georgia 
(N=1,179), Palestine (N=948), Ghana (N=1,552), Hong Kong (N=953), India (N=5,329), Iraq (N=1,118), Japan 
(N=1,627), Kazakhstan (N=1,500), Jordan (N=1,166), South Korea (N=1,162), Kuwait (N=948), Kyrgyzstan 
(N=1,441), Lebanon (N=1,166), Libya (N=1,890), Malaysia (N=1,299), Mexico (N=1,881), Morocco (N=886), 
Netherlands (N=1,449), New Zealand (N=597), Nigeria (N=1,759), Pakistan (N=1,200), Peru (N=1,063), 
Philippines (N=1,192), Poland (N=778), Romania (N=1,328), Russia (N=1,945), Rwanda (N=1,527), Singapore 




beyond WEIRD countries (i.e. Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic; 
Henrich, Heine, Norenzayan, 2010).  
 Subjective Social Class Independent Variable. We used respondents’ self-reported 
subjective social class (1=“Lower class,” 2=“Working class,” 3=“Lower middle class,” 
4=“Upper middle class,” 5= “Upper class”) as our primary independent variable (M = 2.71, SD = 
1.00). 
 Objective Social Class Independent Variable. To assess objective social class, we first 
standardized respondents’ self-reported monthly household income and highest educational level 
attained. The monthly household income response options represented deciles of each country’s 
household income distribution as defined by each country’s principal investigators (M = 4.88, SD 
= 2.10). Educational attainment was assessed on a 9-point scale (1 = “No formal education”, 2 = 
“Incomplete primary school”, 3 = “Complete primary school”, 4 = “Incomplete secondary 
school: technical/vocational type”, 5 = “Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type”, 
6 = “Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type”, 7 = “Complete secondary: university-
preparatory type”, 8 = “Some university-level education, without degree”, 9 = “University-level 
education, with degree”) (M = 5.68, SD = 2.41). Next, we assessed the reliability of these two 
standardized values as a two-item measure of objective social class (α = 0.40). The alpha value 
was too low to justify combining the two items into a single scale. Therefore, we report the 
results from separate analyses using the income and educational attainment variables below. 
 Morality Dependent Variable. Our morality measure captured respondents’ ratings of the 
justifiability of nine different unethical behaviors (from 1 = “Never justifiable” to 10 = “Always 
justifiable”). The nine unethical behaviors (α=0.86) that formed the basis of our outcome 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Thailand (N=1,092), Trinidad (N=915), Tunisia (N=1,025), Turkey (N=1,523), Ukraine (N=1,500), Egypt 




measure were: stealing property, violence against other people, claiming government benefits to 
which you are not entitled, cheating on taxes if you have a chance, someone accepting a bribe in 
the course of their duties, parents beating children, avoiding a fare on public transport, for a man 
to beat his wife, and suicide (M = 2.30, SD = 1.50).
8
 
 Control Variables. We controlled for a number of variables that may affect individuals’ 
beliefs related to the justifiability of unethical behavior including marital status, gender, and age. 
We also included fixed effects for year. See Tables 3-4 for the correlations among all the 
variables used in the current study and complete regression results.  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 3-4 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 Results. We used a linear regression procedure with clustered standard errors (on 
country) to account for correlated responses within country. As predicted, we found a curvilinear 
relationship (U-shaped) between subjective social class and the reported justifiability of 
unethical behavior such that middle-class respondents believed unethical behavior was less 
justifiable than upper and lower class respondents with control variables (subjective social class 
squared: b = 0.086, SE = 0.024, p < .001) and without control variables (subjective social class 
                                                          
8 Respondents reported the justifiability of a total of 15 different behaviors on the WVS. In addition to the nine 
behaviors already mentioned, respondents also indicated the justifiability of the following 6 behaviors: prostitution, 
abortion, euthanasia, homosexuality, divorce, and sex before marriage. Because we do not believe that all 15 
behaviors are universally unethical, we asked workers on Mechanical Turk (N=105, age M = 32.41, SD = 10.43, 
42% women) the following: “Some behaviors are universally considered to be unethical whereas other behaviors 
may only be considered unethical by people from a particular country, religion, or political affiliation. Below are 15 
different behaviors. Please rate the extent to which each behavior would be considered unethical across cultures, 
religions, and political affiliations. That is, if a behavior is only considered to be unethical by a certain segment of 
the world's population (e.g. people from a particular country, religion, or religious affiliation), then that behavior is 
NOT universally unethical.” Responses were recorded on a 1-7 scale from 1 = “Definitely NOT a universally 
unethical behavior” to 7 = “Definitely a universally unethical behavior”. We chose to use the 9 behaviors mentioned 
in the main text because those were the only behaviors that received an average unethical rating that was above the 
midpoint of the response scale. Importantly, however, the results reported in the main text hold when using only the 





squared: b = 0.102, SE = 0.024, p < .01). However, this pattern of results only weakly emerged 
or did not emerge at all with respect to monthly household income (income squared: with 
controls, b = 0.009, SE = 0.004, p < .05, without controls, b = 0.009, SE = 0.006, p = .12) and 
educational attainment (income squared: with controls, b = -0.004, SE = 0.005, p = .33, without 
controls, b = -0.008, SE = 0.007, p = .27).  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 12-13 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 This pattern of results supports our prediction that the middle-power morality effect is 
primarily driven by subjective perceptions of one’s standing relative to others and not necessarily 
by one’s objective control over valued resources. In the next study we attempt to replicate this 
effect using two different measures of subjective power. 
Study 6: Evidence of Middle-Class Morality from the South African Social Attitudes 
Survey (SASAS) 
 We acquired data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) conducted by 
the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). The SASAS is a nationally representative, 
cross-sectional survey of South African social attitudes that has been conducted annually since 
2003. Specifically, we assessed respondents’ wealth as a predictor of how acceptable it is to 
engage in marital infidelity. Similar to the previous study, we distinguished between subjective 
and objective wealth, predicting stronger effects in relation to subjective wealth.  
 Sample. Our final sample included responses from 17,319 individuals (59.9% female; age 
M=40.17, SD=15.88) collected during ten survey waves representing the SASAS’s entire history 
(2003-2012). Our primary variables of interest were unavailable in 2003 and 2012. We used two 




Subjective Financial Standing Independent Variable. Our first independent variable was 
assessed from responses to the question, “Would you say that you and your family are…?” 
(1=“Very poor,” 2=“Poor,” 3=“Just getting along,” 4=“Reasonably comfortable,” 5=“Very 
comfortable,” 6=“Wealthy”) (M = 3.04, SD = 1.11). 
Relative Income within Village/Neighborhood Independent Variable. Our second 
independent variable was assessed from responses to the question, “How does your household 
income compare with other households in your village/neighborhood?” (1=“Much below average 
income,” 2=“Below average income,” 3=“Average income,” 4=“Above average income,” 
5=“Much above average income”) (M = 2.44, SD = 0.94). 
Objective Monthly Household Income Independent Variable. To assess objective income 
we used respondents’ self-reported monthly household income which was assessed on a 14-point 
scale (1=“No income,” 2=“R1-R500,” 3=“R501-R750,” 4=“R751-R1000,” 5=“R1001-R1500,” 
6=“R1501-R2000,” 7=“R2001-R3000,” 8=“R3001-R5000,” 9=“R5001-R7500,” 10=“R7501-
R10000,” 11=“R10001-R15000,” 12=“R15001-R20000,” 13=“R20001-R30000,” 
14=“R30001+”) (M = 6.67, SD = 3.27). 
Morality Dependent Variable. Our morality dependent variable was related to marital 
infidelity: “Do you think it is wrong or not wrong for a married person to have sexual relations 
with someone to whom he or she is not married?” (1=“Always wrong”, 2=“Almost always 
wrong”, 3=“Wrong only sometimes”, 4=“Not wrong at all”).  
Control Variables. We controlled for a number of variables that may affect individuals’ 
beliefs related to the acceptability of marital infidelity including ethnicity, marital status, gender, 




for the correlations among all the variables used in the current study and complete regression 
results.  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 5-6 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 Results. We used a linear regression procedure with robust standard errors. As predicted, 
we found a curvilinear relationship (U-shaped) between subjective financial standing and the 
acceptability of marital infidelity such that middle-wealth respondents believed marital infidelity 
was less acceptable than upper and lower-wealth respondents with control variables (subjective 
financial standing squared: b = 0.026, SE = 0.004, p < .001) and without control variables 
(subjective financial standing squared: b = 0.024, SE = 0.004, p < .001). The same pattern of 
results emerged with respect to relative income within one’s village/neighborhood with control 
variables (relative income squared: b = 0.044, SE = 0.006, p < .001) and without control 
variables (relative income squared: b = 0.040, SE = 0.006, p < .001). A similar, but weaker, 
pattern emerged with respect to monthly household income (income squared: with controls, b = 
0.002, SE = 0.001, p < .01, without controls, b = 0.002, SE = 0.001, p < .01).  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 14-15 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
  
 In this study we found additional evidence in support of a middle-power morality effect 
using data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey. Respondents who subjectively 
perceived their wealth to be near the middle of the distribution and who felt their household 
earned an average amount of income relative to others in their immediate village/neighborhood 
believed that marital infidelity was less acceptable than individuals at either end of the subjective 




income. Consistent with the results from the previous study, these results suggest that the 
middle-power morality effect is primarily driven by individuals’ subjective assessments of their 
power (i.e., wealth) in relation to their reference group (i.e., their neighbors). 
CONCLUSION 
 In this dissertation, I have attempted to theoretically, empirically, and methodologically 
advance knowledge related to the psychological experience of middle-power. First, I sought to 
extend and update the approach/inhibition theory of power (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 
2003) by developing a novel theoretical framework related to the psychological experience of 
middle-power (Anicich & Hirsh, 2016) that draws from and integrates insights from identity 
(Ashforth & Johnson, 2001; Stryker, 1980) and role transition (Ashforth, Kreiner, & Fugate, 
2000) theories. I believe that our framework holds the potential to substantively contribute to the 
social hierarchy literature more generally. Second, I conducted a systematic review of the social 
hierarchy literature over the past 10 years and found that scholars have considered the middle of 
stratifying variable distributions in only 5.4% of past empirical investigations. I concluded that 
existing findings in the social hierarchy literature may be usefully updated by considering 
middle-power effects. Third, as one example of the need to potentially revisit findings in the 
social hierarchy literature, I examined the relationship between power and unethical behavior 
and found evidence of a curvilinear relationship. Middle-power individuals were consistently 
found to be more ethical than both their higher and lower-power counterparts. Taken together, 
these findings suggest that the psychological experience of middle-power is an understudied, 
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Figure 3. Structural characteristics that are proposed to affect the intensity of vertical code-




Figure 4. Computer interface in which participants allocated unethical behaviors among high,  















Figure 5. Mean number of unethical behaviors allocated to each coworker (Study 1). Errors bars  
 





Figure 6. Computer interface in which participants allocated unethical behaviors among high,  




Figure 7. Mean number of unethical adjectives allocated to each coworker (Study 2). 
 




















Figure 10. Mediation model showing the effects of power on unethical behavior as mediated by 
identity threat and psychological entitlement. β1 paths indicate the comparison of low-power 
participants with middle-power participants, and β2 paths indicate the comparison of high-power 
participants with middle-power participants (see Hayes & Preacher, 2014, for a full description 
of this analytic strategy for testing mediation with a multicategorical predictor). All values are 
standardized coefficients. Values in parentheses represent direct relationships; values without 
parentheses represent relationships after all variables were included in the model (*p < .05, **p < 






Figure 11. Number of times each social class was chosen as the most unethical by participants.  




Figure 12. Justifiability of unethical behavior by subjective social class from World Values  
 






Figure 13. Justifiability of unethical behavior by objective income and educational attainment  
 






Figure 14. Acceptability of marital infidelity by subjective financial standing (top panel) and by 
relative income within village/neighborhood (bottom panel) from the South African Social 







Figure 15. Acceptability of marital infidelity by objective household income from the South  
 











Table 2. Complete list of items from identity threat and psychological entitlement measures  
 
 (Study 3).
Identity Threat  
(Aquino & Douglas, 2003; from 1=Never to 5=All of the time) 
 
Please respond to the following items using the option that best reflects how often you think 
other individuals in your organization would treat you in each of the following ways. 
 
How often would another individual in your organization cause you psychological or emotional 
discomfort by... 
 
1. doing something to make you look bad 
2. swearing at you 
3. making insulting comments about your private life 
4. looking at you in a negative way 
5. judging your work in an unjust manner 
6. criticizing you unfairly 
7. questioning your abilities or judgments 
8. embarrassing you in front of your coworkers 
9. unfairly blaming you for a negative outcome 
 
Psychological Entitlement 
(Campbell et al., 2004; from 1=Strong disagreement to 7=Strong agreement) 
 
Please respond to the following items using the option that best reflects how you would feel as 
someone in your position in the organization. 
 
1. I honestly feel I’m just more deserving than others. 
2. Great things should come to me. 
3. If I were on the Titanic, I would deserve to be on the first lifeboat! 
4. I demand the best because I’m worth it. 
5. I do not necessarily deserve special treatment. 
6. I deserve more things in my life. 
7. People like me deserve an extra break now and then. 
8. Things should go my way. 





Table 3. Correlation table using the World Values Survey Data (Study 5) 
 
 
Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
1. Subjective Social Class 2.71 1.00
2. Objective Social Class 0.01 0.79 .476**
3. Monthly Household Income 4.88 2.10 .451** .791**
4. Highest Education Level 5.68 2.41 .302** .791** .252**
5. Year 2011.99 1.05 -.029** -.101** -.009** -.150**
6. Gender (1=Male, 2=Female) 1.52 0.50 -.019** -.050** -.030** -.049** -.029**
7. Age 41.61 16.26 -.035** -.189** -.116** -.183** -.108** .014**
8. Justifiability of Unethical Behavior 2.30 1.50 -0.004 .040** .076** -.013** .150** -.040** -.131**
Variables
N = 76,834




Table 4. Regression table using the World Values Survey Data (Study 5) 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 2.959*** (0.368) 2.853*** (0.216) 2.209*** (0.146) 2.261*** (0.164) 2.171*** (0.140) 2.279*** (0.237)
Fixed Effect for Year No Yes No Yes No Yes
Marital Status (ref. Married)
Living Together as Married 0.223 (0.118) 0.238 (0.121) 0.222 (0.118)
Divorced 0.124* (0.053) 0.149** (0.055) 0.127* (0.052)
Separted 0.273*** (0.073) 0.302*** (0.074) 0.275*** (0.072)
Widowed 0.094* (0.038) 0.131** (0.043) 0.099* (0.041)
Single 0.081 (0.045) 0.086 (0.047) 0.089* (0.044)
Gender (ref. female) -0.116*** (0.023) -0.112*** (0.023) -0.114*** (0.024)
Age -0.009*** (0.001) -0.009*** (0.001) -0.010*** (0.001)
Subjective Social Class -0.557* (0.130) -0.451*** (0.130)
Subjective Social Class Squared 0.102** (0.024) 0.086*** (0.024)
Monthly Household Income -0.033 (0.050) -0.045 (0.037)
Monthly Household Income Squared 0.009 (0.006) 0.009* (0.004)
Highest Educational Attainment 0.074 (0.079) 0.041 (0.055)
Highest Educational Attainment Squared -0.008 (0.007) -0.004 (0.005)
N 76,834 76,834 76,834 76,834 76,834 76,834
Dependent Variable: Justifiability of Unethical Behavior (9-item)
Unstandardized coefficients are reported, with clustered robust standard errors (on country) in parentheses.









Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
1. Subjective Financial Standing 3.04 1.11
2. Relative Income within Village 2.44 0.94 .633**
3. Objective Social Class -0.03 0.87 .545** .486**
4. Monthly Household Income 6.67 3.27 .536** .500** .864**
5. Highest Education Level 10.50 4.64 .411** .344** .870** .504**
6. Year 2007.55 2.26 .087** .070** .162** .173** .109**
7. Gender (ref. female) 1.60 0.49 -.037** -.036** -.083** -.074** -.069** -0.01
8. Age 40.17 15.88 -0.007 -.019* -.181** .017* -.327** .026** .018*
9. Num. Household Members 4.14 2.42 -.051** -.037** 0.002 .038** -.034** -0.011 .153** -.123**
10. Acceptability of Marital Infidelity 1.38 0.84 .020** 0.009 -.016* -.043** 0.014 .052** -.050** -.069** -.021**
Variables





Table 6. Regression table using the South African Social Attitudes Survey Data (Study 6) 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 1.557*** (0.041) 1.738*** (0.058) 1.588*** (0.037) 1.786*** (0.054) 1.523*** (0.029) 1.717*** (0.047)
Fixed Effect for Year No Yes No Yes No Yes
Ethnicity Dummy (ref. White)
                                          Black African -0.114*** (0.017) -0.111*** (0.017) -0.104*** (0.018)
                                          Coloured -0.180*** (0.020) -0.167*** (0.020) -0.150*** (0.021)
                                          Indian or Asian -0.197*** (0.022) -0.169*** (0.022) -0.146*** (0.025)
Marital Status (ref. Married)
Widower or Widow -0.021 (0.021) -0.024 (0.021) -0.030 (0.021)
Divorced 0.048 (0.036) 0.049 (0.036) 0.042 (0.036)
Separted 0.080 (0.054) 0.079 (0.054) 0.069 (0.055)
Never Married 0.057*** (0.016) 0.053** (0.016) 0.046** (0.017)
Gender (ref. female) -0.071*** (0.013) -0.072*** (0.013) -0.074*** (0.014)
Age -0.002*** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000)
Num. Household Members -0.008** (0.003) -0.008** (0.003) -0.007** (0.003)
Subjective Financial Standing -0.146*** (0.027) -0.114*** (0.027)
Subjective Financial Standing Squared 0.026*** (0.004) 0.024*** (0.004)
Relative Income within Village -0.207*** (0.031) -0.173*** (0.031)
Relative Income within Village Squared 0.044*** (0.006) 0.040*** (0.006)
Objective Household Income -0.034*** (0.008) -0.026** (0.009)
Objective Household Income Squared 0.002** (0.001) 0.002** (0.001)
N 17,319 17,319 17,319 17,319 17,319 17,319
Dependent Variable: Acceptability of Marital Infidelity
Unstandardized coefficients are reported, with robust standard errors in parentheses.
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